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ABSTRACT

The case of Kosovo‟s independence raised concern regarding setting a precedence for
other pro self-determination movements in the world. The critical question is if the Kosovo case
actually sets a precedent for these movements or if it is a unique case due to its sui generis
situation. This paper is an attempt to analyze the legality and the legitimate right of Kosovo to
become an independent state. The study examines the phenomenon of the creation of new states
in the world, looking at historical events such as decolonization and the dissolution of
communist countries in Eastern Europe. In addition, I have included facts describing the
continuous acts of genocide perpetrated by Serbs over the years and the ethnic cleansing and
expulsion of Albanian populations through the centuries. Equally important is the analysis of
Kosovo‟s status within the 1974 Constitution and its abolition, which in one way started the
dissolution of the SFRY. This paper concludes that Kosovo has a historical and legal right to be
independent due to its uniqueness in suffering a long history of genocide, ethnic cleansing, the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the extended period of the United Nations administration,
and the United Nations negotiations toward independence with international support.
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INTRODUCTION
It is for people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.
Judge Hardy Dillard, October 16, 1975, ICJ, Western Sahara’s case

After Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, the debate surrounding
the legal and political foundations for establishing sovereignty has become a hot topic among
international law scholars and international lawyers. This is the second time that Kosovo is
putting international lawyers in the quandary about this complicated and unique case. Initially, it
happened when member states of NATO decided to carry out humanitarian intervention by
trying to end genocide in this country. At that time many international lawyers were debating
between prohibitions on the use of force and respect of state sovereignty of the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro), and the imperative to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe due to a massive human right violations and genocide. Therefore, this
conflict at that time qualified as a hard case under international law that stimulated the
development of new legal rules.1
Almost a year after Kosovo‟s declaration of independence, on December 1, 2009 Kosovo
once again grabbed headlines after the public hearings at the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter the ICJ] in The Hague. The ICJ was asked to provide an advisory opinion by the UN
general assembly on Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for

1

Krieger, Heike., The Kosovo Conflict and International Law; An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, (2001),
Cambridge University Press, UK, p. xix.
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Advisory Opinion)2. Many countries contributed by writing statements and comments to the ICJ
regarding this case, in addition to participating with oral statements in front of ICJ judges.
Finally, on July 22, 2010, the ICJ found that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion
requested by General Assembly of the United Nations and decided to act in accordance with that
request, by a nine to five majority. Furthermore, the ICJ voted by a ten to four majority as
follows “[The ICJ] is of the opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on
February 17, 2008, did not violate international law. 3 The Republic of Serbia, being incapable
of using the military, paramilitary, and police forces that it previously used against Kosovo‟s
attempts at independence, turned to the UN with hopes that through the UN and the ICJ it could
prevent and make Kosovo‟s case for independence illegal.
As a state, Serbia had two options to submit a case to the ICJ. The first option was a
“contentious case” that involves disputes between two state entities and is regulated by Article
34 of the Statute of the ICJ. The reason that the Republic of Serbia avoided this alternative is that
for states to be eligible parties in ICJ contentious case proceedings, these states must consent to
the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The Republic of Serbia was also deterred by the fact that ICJ
recognition of jurisdiction over Kosovo would automatically legalize Kosovo‟s sovereignty. That
is primarily the reason that the Republic of Serbia wished for a second option, which was to go
through the General Assembly or other organs of the United Nations to initiate the procedure for
an advisory opinion.4 Obviously, the Republic of Serbia was not pleased with this ICJ verdict,

2

GA Res. 63/3 (Oct.8, 2008); see ICJ Press Release No. 2008/34, The General Assembly of the United Nations
Request an Advisory Opinion from the Court on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (Oct. 10,
2008), at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/14797.pdf. p. 1.
3
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/14797.pdf. p. 1.
4
Perritt, Henry. H., Jr., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: a chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, (2010), Cambridge
University Press, UK. p. 225-6.
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therefore it continued toward the UN GA for the last time with the new resolution although this
time with Serbian and EU sponsorship.5
The UN welcomed the readiness of the EU to assist a process of dialogue
between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace,
security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote
cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the
lives of the people.6

This paper will analyze the legal and political foundations of Kosovo‟s declaration of
independence, and thus examine a number of aspects that are linked to my topic and related to
international relations. My thesis will provoke many questions such as; what is the problem with
the legality of the declaration of independence, why is it so complicated for some states to
understand or to accept Kosovo‟s independence, and why is Kosovo‟s case sui generis7? To
tackle these questions, I will provide a literature review to search for arguments that will address
my thesis by examining current sources from the ICJ, International Law literature, International
Relations literature, the UN Charter, and other important documents and conventions. In
addition, I will further the study by finding similar cases that are comparable to Kosovo‟s case.
I will argue that the Kosovo‟s case is unique due to many factors such as an act of
genocide, the presence and administration by UNMIK8 since 1999, and the UN-led negotiations
process toward final status through UNOSEK9. This paper will also analyze the ICJ decision
about the Kosovo case and the UN GA consensus resolution GA/10980 where the GA

5

GA/10980, Sixty-fourth General Assembly, Plenary 120 Meeting (PM), September 9, 2010.
GA A/RES/64/298, Sixty-fourth session, Agenda item 77, October 13, 2010. p. 2.
7
Sui generis-[lat] of its own kind, unique,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_us1295563#m_en_us1295563
8
UNMIK- is United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.
9
UNOSEK- is United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo,
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/index.html
6
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acknowledges the world court opinion on Kosovo and welcomes EU readiness to facilitate the
process of dialogue.10
With that said, this thesis will attempt to persuade those states who are skeptical about
Kosovo‟s case. By skeptical I mean all those states that are not convinced of Kosovo‟s right to be
an independent state. This thesis will combine two methods of research. In the historical part,
there will be quantitative studies of demographic and economic figures from the former
Yugoslavia and for the other chapters, there will be qualitative studies used, relying on
descriptive or case information and analysis. Consequently, following chapters will discuss
Kosovo‟s case and prove legality of the declaration of independence by not undermining the
political and factual situation.
This thesis contends that Kosovo‟s declaration of independence has a historical, legal and
political foundation, and it is incontrovertible. Kosovo had its various forms of independence
during history11 and the Kosovo people expressed their will and the right to self-determination
many times throughout history. Hence, as Kumbaro states:
The Kosovo Albanians as a group are entitled to the right to self-determination for
the reason that they traditionally lived and continue to do so in a distinct territory
with clearly defined borders. They have persistently cultivated and preserved their
own ethnic identity through the development of their language, customs and
traditions, and by practicing their religion, in defiance of the systematic repression
consistently exerted by the Serbian authorities.12
This is supported by a group of rights which relied upon the principle of equal rights and
self-determination interpreted by: the Geneva Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), the
10

GA/10980, September, 2010.
Stavileci, Esat., Political History of the Kosova Issue, [Kosova dhe ceshtja shqiptare ne udhekryqet e kohes],
2005, Prograf, Prishtina, Kosovo, p. 622-624.
12
Kumbaro, Dajena., The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial
Integrity and the NATO Intervention, 2001, For North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Office of Information and
Press, p. 47.
11
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Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or Helsinki Final Act (1975), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States (1934), and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(1993). Therefore, Kosovo‟s case of declaration of independence will be elaborated throughout
the following chapters in this paper in order to ascertain its legal and political foundation to
prove, as the only feasible verdict that can bring justice for Kosovo Albanians and peace in the
region.
The first chapter will broadly discuss the creation of new states in the world as an
ongoing process throughout history and into the future. To illustrate this chapter more
adequately, I will use some cases that contributed to the creation of new states such as through
decolonization, dissolution of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), former
Yugoslavia, and the breakup of Czechoslovakia; as well as some contra cases where states have
unified to create a new state.
The following chapter will then contain historical facts that prove Kosovo never belonged
to Serbia, except when it was occupied by force. It will point out injustices and decisions made
by great powers that were disadvantageous for the Albanian population such as; Serbian
annexations of Albanian populated territories before and after the Berlin Congress (1878), and
Serbian national programs for en masse expulsion of non-Serbian populations, particularly
Albanians, drafted by Ilija Garasanin in 1844 called Nacetranije (Outline) who was the foreign
minister of Serbia for several terms until 1867. Academic Vasa Cubrilovic wrote “Expulsion of
Albanians” memorandum in 1937” that was a blueprint for ethnic cleansing, “Minority Problems
in New Yugoslavia” also memorandum in 1944. Another academic Ivo Andric wrote “Draft on
Albania” in 1939 as one more nationalistic draft against Albania and Albanians. Moreover,
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Serbia circulated a Blue Book13 as a reaction to the 1974 Constitution followed by a more
sophisticated plan carried out by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (1986) known as
Memorandum SANU,14 the last of which was drafted and executed based on the Greater Serbian
project by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 called „shoe horse’ operation.
Finally, the third chapter contains some facts regarding Kosovo‟s status within the 1974
Yugoslav and Kosovo constitution. This illustrates important articles and explanations of the
constitution that clarifies the self-governing role that Kosovo had; these articles were crucial for
Milosevic‟s actions on the abolition of Kosovo‟s constitution in 1989 and following events
thereafter. This chapter also summarizes Kosovo‟s case as a continuation of Yugoslav
dissolution while including ICJ developments. Some scholars say that everything started and
ended in Kosovo. In fact, it started in Serbia and continued there as a result of changes in the
constitutional juridical status of Kosovo and Vojvodina that abolished their autonomy which was
defined and guaranteed by the Constitution of former Yugoslavia of 1974.15 Then again, based
on the current activities within the Republic of Serbia the story of Yugoslav dissolution is not yet
completed. In fact, the Northern Province of Vojvodina who won greater self-governance
recently16 and the southern region of Sandzak that is asking for autonomy will be a potential
problem for this part of the world. An additional change that can occur with regards to this entire
situation will be the modification of the current name of the process, from the dissolution of
13

Blue Book-a top secret document on the malfunction of relations between Serbia in one side and Kosovo and
Vojvodina on the other side. Circulated among Serbian communists and it showed future steps on abolishing
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
14
Hasani, Enver., Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability, National Defence Academy
Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management in co-operation with: PfP Consortium of Defence Academies
and Security Studies Institutes, Vienna, Austria, 2003, p. 126, 168. For further reading on expulsion of Albanian
population, please see: Philip J. Cohen Serbia’s Secret War, Propaganda and the Deceit of History, 1996, Texas
A&M University Press, USA.
15
Stavileci, 2005, p. 649.
16
An Autonomous Vojvodina; Exit Strategy, A Serbian province wins greater self-governance, The Economist,
January 2nd 2010, London, UK, p. 39.
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Yugoslavia to the dissolution of Serbia in the future. Similarly, Wilson quotes Higgins
comments on this subject matter related to the former Yugoslavia “[t]here is, quite simply, no
end to the disintegrative process that are encouraged,”17 or I would say provoked. It is evident
that all former Yugoslavia cases are connected directly or indirectly with name of the Republic
of Serbia.

17

Wilson, Gary., Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo, Netherland International Law
Review (NILR), 2009, v.LVI, pp. 475-476.
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LITERATURE REWIEV
The international literature regarding Kosovo‟s declaration of independence and the
humanitarian intervention undertaken by NATO is quite controversial given that there are two
groups with different points of view. There are geopolitical interests involved, as well as varying
institutions, experts and scholars on this subject. However, there is another group that is more
moderate and flexible who believes on more reasonable considerations toward an international
law perspective. The most distinguished and most recent source of information concerning this
subject matter was undertaken during the proceedings at the ICJ for Kosovo‟s case, in which
many experts of international law were involved as well as representatives of the Republic of
Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia and other participating countries.
Unsurprisingly, there were states involved that were more concerned than others were
about Kosovo‟s or Serbia‟s fate and the legality of the declaration of independence. The reason
that led to such concern stemmed more from the problems within their own countries, such as
minority and succession movements within their own borders. Fearing that Kosovo‟s case would
give precedent to their internal minority problems, causing secession and truncating their
territory. Examples are Spain‟s Basque and Catalonia regions, Romania with a Hungarian
minority of 6.6 % (1,431,207) of total population18, Slovakia with a Hungarian minority of 9.7 %
of the total population,19 Cyprus and Greece relationship with north Turkish Cyprus, Russia‟s
problems with Chechnya and Russian solidarity with the Orthodox Serbs, 20 among others.
Equally important is the fact that Russian (along with China and India) have stated their belief in
18

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html based on Romanian 2002 census.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lo.html based on Slovakian 2001 census.
20
Jubilant Kosovo, chastened Serbia. The fallout from a surprisingly pro-Kosovo legal decision, The Economist,
July 31st 2010, London, UK, p. 40.
19
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the principle of territorial integrity yet Russia recognized the two secessionist regions of Georgia
(South Ossetia and Abkhazia).21 (See Table 1.)
Although, Greece did not recognize Kosovo as a state it does however recognize
Kosovo‟s passports, which are released by the Kosovo government22; which could be called tacit
recognition. Similarly, Shaw (2003) mentions this kind of recognition23 by referring to Article 7
of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States24 stating: “The recognition of a
state may be express or tacit; the latter results from any act which implies the intention of
recognizing the new state.” Shaw refers to this situation by comparing the Arab countries with
regard to Israel and the UK in regards to North Vietnam.
Furthermore, Article 6 of this Montevideo Convention states that “Recognition is
unconditional and irrevocable.” Since the declaration of independence, the Republic of Serbia
requested those states that recognized Kosovo‟s independence to withdraw their
acknowledgment. In fact, as Shaw (2003) explains, recognition can be withdrawn in certain
circumstances, however, if the state was de facto recognized then it is easier to withdraw
recognition, on the other hand, once the state is de jure recognized then it is more difficult to
withdraw the recognition, yet it is not impossible. Specifically this happened when the UK
recognized the Italian occupation of Ethiopia de facto in 1936 and then de jure after two years,
thus resulting in the withdrawal of recognition in 1940. Although, Shaw emphasizes that

21

Ibid, pp. 39-40.
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=19&nav_id=53613 (09/19/2008)
23
Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, 2003, Cambridge University Press, UK, p. 385.
24
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Published December 26, 1933. This treaty was signed
22

at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933. It entered into
force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the definition and rights of statehood.
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withdrawal of recognition cannot be mistaken with the ending of diplomatic relations.25
Meanwhile, the Serbian request for withdrawing Kosovo‟s recognition seems to be ridiculous
when the facts and figures regarding Kosovo‟s recognition are shown in a list of countries that
have signed documents thus proving their recognition. Therefore, the Republic of Serbia was
rather trying to win time by creating confusion among those states that did not recognize Kosovo
as a new state, then expecting the withdrawal of recognition from those states that did in fact
recognize Kosovo. As a result, the attempt to gain time pressed the Republic of Serbia to bring
this matter to ICJ.
Furthermore, Professor Malcolm Shaw also represented the Republic of Serbia at the ICJ
on December 1, 2009, where he declared that the Republic of Serbia agrees that the principle of
territorial integrity does not freeze the territorial configuration of a state at any given moment.
Consensual change is always possible. In addition, he states that the relevant parties may agree to
alter the territorial delineation of state.26
Conversely, Professor Esat Stavileci in his recent comments regarding the ICJ opinion
(July 23rd 2010) points out that the principle of territorial integrity is valid only in relationships
between two states and it is not applicable for ethnic groups that want to build their own state.
Furthermore, Stavileci (2010) stresses another fact regarding territory, Kosovo is a territory that
came out of a federation that has dissolved, and it has been under UN interim administration
(UNMIK).27 Moreover, to support the matter of territorial integrity, Professor Koskenniemi
(2010) at the ICJ also stated:

25

Shaw, 2003, pp. 388-390.
ICJ, CR 2009/24, Public Sitting, The Hague, December 1 2009, Verbatim Record, p. 65.
27
http://www.esat.stavileci.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=177&Itemid=1
26
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[t]erritorial integrity only governs relations between and not inside states, its
power is limited to that of general value of protecting existing States that must be
weighed against countervailing consideration.28
In addition to such thoughts, he notes self-determination as the most important
countervailing consideration that has always implied the possibility of secession in cases when
the parent State is not capable or is unwilling to give assurance of internal protection.29 Likewise,
in the case of the Aaland Islands the Commission of Rapporteurs mentioned “the State lack
either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.”30 Crawford (2006)
describes this case as “territories that are so badly misgoverned” and as carence de
souverainete.31 Likewise, the argument that the State is responsible for internal protection is
raised by former UN Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan (1999) as well at the opening of the
general debate of the General Assembly when he declared:
State sovereignty is being redefined by the forces of globalization and
international cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be the servant of
its people, not vice versa.32
Equally important, the ICJ (2010/25) considers “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity
is confined to the sphere of relations between States.” This consideration is predetermined on
the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of August 1,
1975 “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating
States” (Article IV Territorial integrity of States).33

28

ICJ, CR 2009/30, Public Sitting, The Hague, December 8 th 2009, p. 63-64.
Ibid, p. 64.
30
Ibid, p. 61.
31
Crawford, James., The Creation of New States in International Law, 2006, Oxford University Press, UK, p.111.
32
Annan, Kofi A., Two Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist, September 18th, 1999. Also at:
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=28
33
ICJ, No. 2010/25, Press Release, July 2010, The Hague, P. 4. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf
29
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At the ICJ presentation, Professor Shaw (2010)34 fails to remember an important fact
when he mentions consensual changes among two parties, in this case between Kosovo and
Serbia. In the past, there were attempts to acquire a consensus such as the internationally
sponsored Rambouillet Conference (held from February 6-23, 1999 and signed by Kosovar
leaders on March 19, 1999) where Serbia refused to sign this Peace Accords.35 Another effort
was made under the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for the Future Status Process
for Kosovo (UNOSEK) (2006-2007) led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisari as a UNSG
Special Envoy (SE) and Mr. Albert Rohan (Austria) as Deputy to the Special Envoy (DSE) for
the future status process for Kosovo. UNOSEK followed after a previous Secretary-General
appointee, Ambassador Kai Eide (May 2005) carried out a thorough review of Kosovo which
instigated the UN Secretary-General to write a letter to the UN Security Council where he
concluded that the time had come to move into the next phase of the political process in Kosovo.
Therefore, the Contact Group (CG), which included France, Germany, Italy, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued “Guiding Principles” for a
settlement of the status of Kosovo as a support for SE in his efforts. These ten principles stated
among other things, any settlement should ensure Kosovo‟s multi-ethnicity, the protection of
cultural and religious heritage, strengthen regional security and stability, and make certain that
Kosovo can cooperate effectively with international organizations and international financial
institutions. This group, also called the Troika, accentuated that any agreement needs to be
acceptable by the people of Kosovo.36 In contrast with the CG principle regarding multiethnicity Professor Stavileci (2005) argues that even during the highest increase of the Slavic
34

ICJ, CR 2009/29, Public Sitting, The Hague, December 8 th 2009, p. 65.
Hasani, Enver., 2003, p. 245. (Mr. Hasani served as a legal adviser of Kosovar Albanian Delegationin
Rambouillet.)
36
www.unosek.org/pressrelease/2005-10-07_-_Contact_Group_-_Ten_Guiding_principles_for_Ahtisari_-_eng.doc
35
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population in Albanian territories between the two World Wars as compulsory colonization, their
percentage could not reach more than 10 % in total population.37
Weller (2009) 38 lays down more than a detailed illustration of the application of, as he
calls it, the entire arsenal of diplomatic tools available. By these diplomatic tools he means: crisis
management, good offices, negotiation and mediation through proximity talks and shuttle
diplomacy, high-level conference diplomacy, action at the UN Security Council, and even the
use of force in the twenty years of the Kosovo crisis that his book covers (1988-2008).
In relation to the ethnic population, in his book International Law (2003) Professor Shaw
refers to Gottman‟s Significance that “most nations indeed developed through a close
relationship with the land they inhabited.”39 Malcolm (2003) brings forth the fact that Albanians
were living in this land for centuries as a native population of Illyrian descendants. The first Slav
invasion occurred during Justinian‟s rule from 547 to 548, into the territory of Modern Kosovo
and continuing Via Macedonia or Via Egnatia across central Albania.40 This was done in an
effort to dislocate native populations and slavicize newcomers.
Professor Shaw elaborates on the recognition of Kosovo at the ICJ proceedings. He
argues that the creation of new states is a combination of effectiveness and legality, and that
recognition cannot legitimate an illegal act. Furthermore, he emphasizes UNMIK as a body that

37

Stavileci, 2005, p. 488.
Weller, Marc., Contested Statehood. Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, 2009, Oxford University Press, UK.
Preface.
39
Shaw, 2003, p. 410.
40
Malcolm, Noel., KOSOVO a Short History, 1999, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., NY, p. 23.
38
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represents Kosovo‟s territory in the external relations and to international organizations as
necessitated by the required criteria of statehood.41
If Professor Shaw believes that recognition is not so important for the creation of new
states, then the question arises based on Crawford‟s (2006)42 writings: why did the UN General
Assembly immediately condemned Southern Rhodesia‟s Unilateral Declaration of
Independence?43 In addition, the UN Security Council called upon all states not to recognize this
illegal racist minority regime and refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime.44
Equally important, the ICJ, in detail explains that some states who participated in Kosovo‟s case
called upon the UN Security Council to pass resolutions that condemned a number of previous
declarations of independence regarding other states. Resolutions that were mentioned were the
UN Security Council resolution 216 and 217 (both from 1965) regarding Sothern Rhodesia, the
UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983) regarding northern Cyprus, and the UN Security
Council resolution 787 (1992) regarding Republika Srpska. Moreover, the Court explains that the
UN Security Council was taking into account the existing circumstances at the time that those
declarations of independence were made, and that any illegality of these declarations of
independence specified above by the UN Security Council is not embedded in the unilateral
character of these declarations as such, but it is based in connection with the risk of use and use
of force itself or other related violations of general international law norms; especially those of
peremptory character (jus cogens). Obviously, the UN Security Council never positioned itself
against Kosovo‟s declaration of independence. Vidmar (2009) states that in Kosovo‟s case “a

41

ICJ, CR 2009/24, December 1, 2009, Public Sitting, The Hague, p. 73 and 75.
Crawford, 2006, p. 129.
43
GA resolution 2024 (XX), November 11, 1965 (107-2:1 (Fr)). 1675th Plenary meeting. Two States did not
participate.
44
SC resolution 216 (1965) November 12, 1965 (10-0:1 (Fr)), paragraph 2.
42
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specific SC resolution that would call for non-recognition is absent and cannot be expected” as a
practice of collective non-recognition.45 Therefore, based on the special character of the
resolutions specified above, the Court confirmed that no general prohibition against unilateral
declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council. 46
At the time when Professor Shaw discussed the importance of recognition, Kosovo
became recognized by 69 (currently 75) states around the world, 22 out of 27 European Union
(EU) members, and had been admitted into both: the International Monetary Fund (IMF)47 and
the World Bank (WB)48 with the support of more than a hundred states.
On the matter of UNMIK, as Kosovo‟s representative in external relations and
international organizations, Professor Shaw should be aware that Kosovo is a member of the
IMF and WB (since June 29, 2009), and international sport organizations. Kosovo already has
diplomatic relations with some of the countries that recognize it. In a six month period, Kosovo
had ten Diplomatic Missions at the embassy level throughout the world: The United States of
America, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Republic of Austria, the Confederation of
Switzerland, the Republic of Albania, and the Republic of Turkey.49 Currently there are twenty
Kosovo Diplomatic Missions abroad, twelve Consular Missions, and twenty-eight Foreign
Missions in Kosovo as embassies and offices of foreign countries, as well as twenty different

45

Vidmar, Jure. , International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 2009, Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law [Vol.42:779
46
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international organizations, economic chambers, military, and other missions.50 What‟s more,
countries that formally recognize Kosovo make up 72.18% of the World‟s total nominal GDP.51
Kosovo is participating in the UN Security Council meetings together with UNMIK
whenever the Security Council is conversing regarding Kosovo. In addition, at the sixty-fourth
UN General Assembly Plenary Meeting Kosovo had a status of an observer based on credentials
that Kosovo had received as a guests of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the United States.52
Albeit, it is a mistake and an anomaly to attempt to compare Kosovo‟s case to the
Republika Srpska given their history of status and establishment. While Kosovo has a long
history and status, the Republika Srpska was established through a policy of ethnic cleansing and
possible genocide.53 This fact was brought up by the former Croatian President (2000-2010)
Stjepan Mesic as well; he called the Republika Srpska a genocidal creation while Kosovo was
part of the union that does not exist. 54 He was the last president of the former SFRY (June 30,
1991- December 6, 1991) and he will be remembered by a quote that he made in the Croatian
parliament on December 6, 1991. The day after having left the Yugoslav presidency, he declared,
“My job is done-there is no more Yugoslavia.” Furthermore, during his visit to Kosovo on
January 8, 2010 he stated that Kosovo‟s constitutional legal status as an autonomous province in
former Yugoslavia was so unique that it cannot be found anywhere else in the world, thus
emphasizing and making it reasonable when it is said that Kosovo‟s case is sui generis.55 Hasani
(2003) describes the paradoxical situation when Kosovo was equated with the illegal Serb
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entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during the „90s.56 He describes an additional
abnormality when another region called Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia, which was
destroyed by Croat forces in 1995, was recognized by Transdiensbir, which itself is part of the
Russian Federation. 57 Hasani (2003) points out the injustice that was made by awarding
Republika Srpska and punishing Kosovo with the continuation of the project of Greater Serbia
(See Map 7.) by being part of FRY (Union of Serbia and Montenegro) until 1999, when NATO‟s
military action halted ethnic cleansing.58 Hasani (2005) once more highlights the position of the
Republika Srpska and Kosovo by comparing their path to creation and existence thus stating:
“Republika Srpska” was the beneficiary of a policy of ethnic cleansing and
genocide against an entire nation, while Kosovo possessed a clear territorial base
and an ethnically dominant population despite being the victim of the Serbian
policy of ethnic cleansing.59
In the case of the Republika Srpska, all three former top leaders of Republika Srpska
(Biljana Plavsic, Radovan Karadjic, and Ratko Mladic) are characterized as war criminals
indicted by International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the same way
the ICTY is prosecuting war criminals for genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as well. It
was the same government headed by Slobodan Milosevic that led the genocide and ethnic
cleansing in the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. However, it was not
only Milosevic‟s government that carried out all these atrocities against non-Serb populations
within territories of the above mentioned states that Serb nationalist consider as a part of
“Greater Serbia.” (See Map 7.)
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Vishesella (2004), presents in his book detailed information and statistics collected
within an organization that gathers Albanians to ancestors used to live in the former Albanian
territory which now belongs to Serbia, called the Association of Kosovo Muhaxhers60 [Shoqata e
Muhaxhereve te Kosoves]. This data contains information about the Serbian genocide from
1878-1912 in the territory of Sandzak of Nish. Based on some Turkish statistics during these
years there were 714 villages populated with Albanians that were conquered by Serbian forces
who confiscated 48,000 houses and the occupants‟ wealth. All these Serbian crimes were
“legalized” by the Berlin Congress (1878). These facts were supported by some English, Serb,
and Turkish documents that also emphasized that during that period of time (1878-1912) 350,000
Albanians were expelled from their territories. Vishesella highlights other information based on
the Serbian newspaper “Samouprava” (1892-1894) which states that there were 24,000
Albanians massacred, mostly women, children, and elderly only in the Toplice region. 61 During
that time Serbia was trying hard to expand its territories by applying enormous military force
against non-Serb civilians, forcing out non-Serb populations from these territories, governing by
force and colonizing these same territories with Serb populations. This was done with assistance
from the Russian alliance that, among other actions helped “legalize” these territories together
with other Great Powers. Crawford (2006) highlights four basic elements for the classical criteria
for statehood: ex factis jus oritur and those that are mentioned in Article I of the Montevideo
Convention on the rights and Duties of States. There are four qualifications for the State as a
subject of international law to possess: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) a
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government; and d) a capacity to enter into relations with other States.62 In other words, Serbia
was making legal territorial expansion out of criminal invasions based on military supremacy
and by exercising genocide and ethnic cleansing, taking advantage of the power vacuum that
occurred as a result of the decline of Ottoman Empire. (See Map 1)
Therefore, the Serbian army and paramilitary are well known for the massacres they
orchestrated in these territories, especially during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. Elsie (2001) brings a collection of documents that support this stand63 and Cohen
(1996)64 gives examples of Serbian state terror against all non-Serbs. All these crimes were
happening in Europe‟s backyard and Europe was not doing anything to stop it. Similarly,
Freundlich (1913) records: “A whole people is perishing on Calvary cross, and Europe remains
silent! “65 It remained silent in the 1990s as well when the Badinter Commission66 (1991-1993)
did not consider Kosovo‟s recognition as an independent republic within the former Yugoslavia
even though it had all characteristics of it. The Commission thus legitimized the status quo for
Kosovo when the Republic of Serbia unilaterally abolished it autonomous status in 1989.67 In
addition, the Assembly of Kosovo, a legitimate organ according to the 1974 Yugoslav
constitution, on July 2, 1990, declared Kosovo as an equal and independent unit within the
Yugoslav federation that still existed.68 Radan (2002) clarifies that this declaration was not one
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of secession from Yugoslavia, but rather from the Republic of Serbia.69 Moreover, Rich (1993)
explains the December 22, 1991 letter from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo to
Lord Carrington.70 Kosovo‟s PM in exile, Bujar Bukoshi informed Lord Carrington about the
referendum held in Kosovo from September 26-30, 1991 with a 87% participation rate in which
99.87% voted in favor of independence. The Kosovo elected leaders met the entire obligations
that were set out in the EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union (December 16, 1991) but the Badinter Commission‟s interpretation left Kosovo
recognized only by Albania.71 Even if Kosovo were to be recognized at that time by most
European countries, as it was in 2008 after it declared independence, it was unlikely that Serbia
would let it go without a war. The attention of the international community to the problem at the
time was postponed especially by Europe, since many states, then and now, considers Kosovo a
European problem. This leads to another question, could Serbia handle another war in Kosovo,
aside from the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? Apparently, after most of the former
Yugoslavia‟s armament had accumulated in the territory of Serbia, and the Republika Srpska
Krajina during the war in Croatia, and the Republika Srpska during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia was able to cope with another battle against the barehanded Albanian
population in Kosovo as long as the international community did not get involved. In the past,
Serbia was not concerned about this but in the 1990s some states were fed up with Serbian
atrocities in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and utilized NATO‟s humanitarian
intervention. Did the NATO humanitarian intervention, followed by UN administration, help
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Kosovo toward independence? Yes, it did without a doubt, but Kosovo did pay a price as well.
Finally, does Kosovo‟s case send the wrong message for other secessionist movements around
the world? Kumbaro (2001) considers:
The international community can and should reject unilateral secessionist
demands in those cases where democratic mechanisms – such as the presence of
an independent and effective judiciary and a representative government – are
available to ethnic groups to preserve and develop their distinct identity,
commensurate with international norms.72
Kumbaro (2001) brings to light facts that are unique characteristics of Kosovo such as the
fact that Kosovo Albanians were subject to systematic Serbian discrimination, revoking all rights
of Kosovo Albanians recognized by the 1974 SFRY Constitution. Furthermore, since 1989,
Serbian authorities had denied the political, economic, social, and cultural development of
Kosovo Albanians, actions that were accompanied by flagrant and massive human right
violations that endangered their physical existence.73
Wilson (2009) brings up the risk that offering the right of secession to Kosovo might spur
newly created states to secede.74 On the contrary, Kosovo Albanians within the Kosovo territory
belonged to the state of Albania except when they were invaded by Serbs, and then Albanians
had been considered as a minority after WWII, with a higher population than other republics
within the federation. Kosovo Albanians‟ rights were protected under the 1974 constitution of
Yugoslavia, even though unfairly considered as a minority, with status of an Autonomous
Province. However, minorities in the new state of Kosovo are protected by the Kosovo
constitution, which includes extensive guarantees for their rights while stressing the values of
equality and anti-discrimination, with both the Albanian and Serb languages as official
72

Kumbaro, 2001, p. 67.
Ibid, pp. 42-46.
74
Wilson, 2009, p. 475.
73

D e v a | 22

languages, and Turkish, Bosnian, and Roma languages as official languages at the municipal
level.75 Chapter III of this constitution includes Articles 57-62 that is about the rights of all
communities and their members.76 This is a modern constitution that took the most democratic
countries‟ constitutions as models, and in regards to minorities it is the most advanced model in
the region. To illustrate, Albanians who live in the Republic of Serbia do not have the same
rights that Serbs have in the Republic of Kosovo. For example, for Kosovo‟s 91% mostly
Albanians citizens, there are 80% parliamentary seats reserved, while for rest of the citizens
which include Serbs, Muslims or Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, etc. for a total of 9% of there
population, there are 20% parliamentary seats reserved.
However, throughout history, Albanians in Kosovo were counted as either a different
nation or some other new invented nation or handicapped on real numbers during official
censuses. Mertus (1999) writes that some demographic data and early population counts
collected by Serbian sources in the region known today as Kosovo were based on Catholic
confession attendance. Data from 1838 based on the notes of Dr. Joseph Miller, a German
traveler, shows population numbers of three districts: Peja, Gjakova, and Prizren (towns in
Kosovo) as 114,000 Muslims (including Albanians) and 81,000 Christians (including Serbs but
also Albanians who attended Catholic confession). An additional abnormality shows that the
census of districts in 1905 shows a variety names for the population. For example: Orthodox
Serbs, Catholic Serbs, Muslim Serbs from Bosnia (this is a non existing ethnicity, but probably
referred Bosniaks), Protestant Serbs (data shows 0 houses and only one person), Turks, Jews,
Albanians, Catholic Albanians, and then it comes the abnormality of “Albanized Muslim
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Serbs.”77 Based on this kind of classification, there are 3 types of Albanians, albeit there is one
Albanian nation that embraces 3 religions (Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox), but there is
absolutely no such entity as Albanized Muslim Serbs. Subsequently, Malcolm (1999) introduces
another well-known fact, Yugoslav State Security action to “convert” Albanians from Kosovo
and Macedonia by the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s to Turks. For instance, in the
1948 census, the number of people registered as “Turks” was 1,315. Five years later in 1953, this
number reached 34,583,78 and the total number of Turks in Yugoslavia jumped from 97,954 in
1948 into 259,535 in 1953.79 This number climbed because of pressure from Belgrade authorities
to deport Yugoslav “Turks” to Turkey after a “Gentleman's” Agreement80 between Yugoslavia
and Turkey.81 (See Table 2.)
Therefore, the idea of Greater Serbia was to colonize Kosovo with Serbian and
Montenegrin populations while the expulsion of mostly Albanian and other non-Serb populations
was occurring. Meanwhile, Serbian propaganda was trumpeting in its defense that Albanians
were a nation that wanted to create a Greater Albania. Gvosdev (2010) discussed this topic as
well who still believes the Serbian propaganda of uniting Albania, Kosovo, and parts of
Macedonia.82 Similarly, Buchanan (2000) thought that by helping Kosovo with NATO and
humanitarian intervention, the United States is facilitating the process of carving out a Greater
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Albania.83 All these assumptions proved to be wrong. Kosovo continues to get recognition as a
sovereign democratic state, while Albania joined NATO and it is continuing toward EU
membership.
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THE CREATION OF NEW STATES IN
THE WORLD

Many politicians of our time are in the habit of laying it down as a self-evident proposition that no
people ought to be free till they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the fool in the old story
who resolved not to go into the water until he had learnt to swim. If men are to wait for liberty till they become
wise and good in slavery, they may indeed wait forever.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, a British poet, historian and Whig politician

The world has witnessed the creation of new states continuously. The Peace of
Westphalia (1648), besides ending the Thirty Years War, has often been seen as the ancestor of
modern nation-state sovereignty as well. The Peace of Westphalia led to the modern system of
states because it established the existence of equality among territorial units. In short, the states
were said to be sovereign.84 Therefore, the process of creation of new states is an ongoing
process, based on history, and it is an unstoppable practice. In fact, the best illustration for this
phenomenon is the expansion of UN member states over the years since the UN was established
in the 1945 with 51 original member states. In June 2006, membership totaled 192 states. Based
on statistics illustrated in Table 3, process of creation of new states is a continuing phenomenon.
In the sixty year time period from when the UN was established until 2005, 140 new states were
created and became members of the UN. There is an average of almost twelve states created in
every five-year period, as it is described in Table 3, or in other words, two states per year. The
biggest contribution in the process of creation of new states was decolonization, as it was one of
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the main causes for state creation particularly after the 1960s.Later the dissolution of states such
as the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s added to the number of new states.
Decolonization created the biggest number of new states, followed by the end of the Cold
War that resulted in the extinction of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the formation of fifteen
new states. Similarly, some new states were created as a result of the dissolution of a bigger
state, as was the case of Yugoslavia. It went through a very painful and violent period, and after
several wars in the 1990s, a total of five new states were created. More than a decade after the
dissolution of SFRY, an additional state was formed within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, for a total, with Montenegro, of
seven new states built out of the former SFRY. Another example is seen in Czechoslovakia,
which ceased to exist on January 1, 1993 by dividing into two new states; the Czech Republic
and the Republic of Slovakia. An additional case is Eritrea, which seceded from Ethiopia and
was admitted into the UN in May 1993 after a plebiscite was held under UN patronage in April
1993,85 even though none of the UN resolutions related to Eritrea since 1952 referred to selfdetermination.86
The creation of new states continues to this day. Recently, a referendum was passed by
the southern territory of Sudan to separate from northern part of Sudan. Most likely, this will
create Africa‟s 54th state,87 and 193rd for the UN. The case of Sudan proves that state creation
plays an ongoing role in global politics. Despite the fact that the decolonization period was over,
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and communist countries fell apart decades ago, there are still new states created, even in those
parts of the world where this process was thought to be over.
New states were not created only by dissolution, unions have created them as well. Some
unions existed only for a specific period of time before breaking up again. For example, the
unions between England and Scotland from 1606 to 1707, Great Britain and Hanover from 1714
to 1837, and Denmark and Iceland from 1918 to 1944, Austro-Hungary from 1867 to 1918, also
described as a real union, the Swedish-Norway union that ended in 1905, and the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth that existed from 1569 to 1791 and was the result of a marriage
between the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the Polish Queen in 1386.88 Similarly, the United
Arab Republic (UAR) formed in February 1958 by the fusion of Egypt and Syria but ceased to
exist in September 1961, after Syria seceded from the union, even though Egypt continued to use
the name for it until September 1971.89 There are also examples throughout the world of ongoing
unifications. On May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen united and created the Republic of
Yemen.90 And in 1992, Serbia and Montenegro unified but split again only a few years later.
Germany is an example of reunification. After WWII, Germany was divided into the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic,91 or East Germany. In 1990,92
reunification occurred and the country once again become the Federal Republic of Germany.
These are just some of the example of unions throughout history, which takes a variety of
different models, such as a union of states, federations, confederations, and other forms of state
establishment.
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DECOLONIZATION AS A NEW STATE CREATOR
The process of decolonization can be seen through different points of view based on
time, location, and performers in this process. Early examples are Spain and Portugal‟s
decolonization of Latin America and Britain and France‟s of North America. Subsequently,
decolonization occurred in the continents of Asia and Africa whose new states became
important cases as the United Nations became institutionally involved in their process of
decolonization. As European control over overseas territories and peoples ended, it ignited
independence movements throughout the decolonized regions. This period of decolonization led
to a substantial increase in the number of states.93 In fact, decolonization has been the most
productive method of state creation. However, it is important to note that not all of the new
states that emerged after 1945, which began the post WWII decolonization process, were
formed as a result of self-determination or independence movements. On the contrary, the
majority of the new states were merely a product of the sweeping decolonization process.94
While decolonization can be considered as a mostly finished act, there are cases that if
requirements of geographic remoteness were removed they would be prospects for
decolonization, or neo-decolonization.95
The new states that did not emerged from situations that are formally recognized as
former colonies and are covered by Chapters XI and XII of the Charter, have been: Senegal
(1960), Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971), three Baltic States; Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
all in 1991, the eleven successor states of the former Soviet Union except Russia and the three
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Baltic States, the five successor states of the former Yugoslavia; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro (2006), and FYR (Serbia) (1991-2), the Czech Republic
and Slovakia (1993), and Eritrea (1993).96 After decolonization ended, the process of creation of
the new states has been achieved as a result of diminution or disappearance of existing states.97
The UN GA resolution 1514 stated that, “All peoples have the right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”98 The UN GA passed a
complementary resolution the following day. Resolution 154199 brought something that
becomes identified as the salt water test or salt water thesis that specifies the colonial situation
in Principle IV as a “territory geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally
from the country administering it.” This geographical territorial separation referred to the sea or
ocean separating the two territories that are colonies or any subjugated entity and states that
colonized another state.100 If that salt water precondition would be excluded, than what would
happened with cases that do not have a sea or ocean between them? After all, there is a
connection between the UN Charter and GA Resolution 1514 because the Charter refers to selfdetermination “peoples,” and the Resolution 1514 declares that “all peoples” have the right to
self-determination.
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Thus, are the cases of Kosovo, South Sudan, Eritrea, and East Timor a continuation of
late decolonization? In all these cases, the UN was involved either through monitoring
referendums or establishing missions in order to govern in the transitional periods. To illustrate,
the UN SC resolution 1272 established the UN administration in East Timor after conflict was
ignited by East Timor‟s rejection in the referendum to accept autonomy within Indonesia.
During this period of almost three years, there was a shared sovereignty between the UN and
East Timor. During this time, East Timor was able to build the basic institutions for selfgoverning. East Timor was recognized as an independent state and was admitted to the UN at
midnight on May 20, 2002. Similarly, Kosovo was under a UN mission (UNMIK) since 1999,
regulated by UNSC Resolution 1244101 that was based on previous resolutions: 1160, 1199,
1203, all in 1998, and 1239 in 1999. The purpose of this resolution was, among other things, to
resolve the “grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo.” Resolution 1244 had a number of dubious
legal issues, such as: first, referring to the FRY knowing that the UN SC Resolutions 757 and
777 did not accept the transfer of membership of the SFRY into the FRY, and that the SFRY
has not existed since 1992, based on these resolutions, or since 1991 based on Badinter
Commission. Second, 1244 mentions “Federal and Republic army” even though there were not
two armies at the time, only what was refrered to as the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries that
were used to operate in wars in Bosnia and Croatia. These paramilitary units were connected to
the secret police of the Serbian interior ministry and were operating as Crvene Beretke [Red
Berets], Munja [Lightning], OPG (Operativna Grupa) [Operative Group], Frenkijevci [The
Frenkies], Beli Orlovi [White Eagles], Arkanovi Tigrovi aka Arkanovci [Arkan‟s Tigers]. Some
members of these groups now fight as a mercenaries or “dogs of war” for Colonel Gaddafi in

101

The UN SC Resolution 1244, 4011th meeting, June 10, 1999. http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement

D e v a | 31

Libya102 and other countries mostly working for African dictators. Third, the resolution 1244
mentions demilitarization KLA and “other armed Kosovo Albanian groups” even though
Albanians only had KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) as a military organized group.
Nevertheless, during the years under UNMIK Kosovo was not under international
governance, on the contrary, it was under international administration. Based on international
theory and practice, there is a distinct difference.103 The Resolution‟s purpose was to preserve
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SUSM, which included Kosovo. It also mentions
the withdrawal of Serbian military, paramilitary, and police forces from Kosovo‟s territory and
the demilitarization of the KLA, and “Facilitating a political process designated to determine
Kosovo‟s future” and “In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo‟s
provisional institutions to institutions established under political settlement.”104 In other words,
territorial integrity and sovereignty had been taken from Serbia by UNMIK. The role of
UNMIK was to practice a custodian style mission, but as Hasani noted, UNMIK realized that it
was not being effective in its mission and suggested that it should try to turn itself into a kind of
“helping hand system,” similar with one in Bosnia and Herzegovina or into an “advise and help
system,” which was later used in East Timor.105 Additionally UNMIK‟s system of Regulations
set a precedent for UN peacekeeping missions around the world. This system was mirrored
during the case of East Timor with UN SC Resolution 1272106 establishing UNTET and later
creating UNTAET Regulations, although there were differences from UNMIK. The main
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differences were as follows: UNMIK did not revoke Serbian discriminatory laws as UNTAED
did with Indonesian laws. The UNMIK Regulations had interventionist character by excluding
any reference to any Kosovar bodies while in East Timor‟s case, UNTAET Regulations
Preamble noted “after consultations in the National Consultative Council.”107 The UNTAED
was established four months after UNMIK but it did establish independence for East Timor
until 2002, when the country‟s UN membership followed that same year. Conversely, Kosovo
declared its own independence in 2008 but is still not a UN member, three years after its
declaration of independence. The preamble of the UN SC Resolution 1272 regarding East
Timor reaffirmed “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia.”108 This was
identically to the UN SC Resolution 1244 regarding Kosovo “reaffirming commitment to
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The illogical aspect
of this is that FRY was not a member state of the UN at that time. Resolution 1244 conflicted
with resolutions 757 and 777 regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY. It was
incongruous to compare the status of FRY with Indonesia. Later, when the FRY disintegrated
into two sates, Serbia and Montenegro, the EU handled the transition process and sponsored the
referendum for the secession from the Republic of Serbia, which was not considered the parent
state in this case. The EU worked at postponing Montenegro‟s independence because it sensed
that could have a spreading effect (similar with domino effect) but by June 28, 2006,
Montenegro was a UN member.109 While no country challenged Montenegro‟s independence, it
was not recognized by about 70 states at the time of its membership110 (51 at the present). The
states that did not recognize Montenegro are mostly states that would not recognize Kosovo as
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well and those that are the states that belong to the Non-Aligned Movement. These states are
nostalgically connected to the former SFRY, and the Republic of Serbia is still trying
diplomatically to convince those states that it is the only valid successor of the former SFRY,
and that all other SFRY former republics and Kosovo betrayed SFRY. However, these states
should ask themselves why none of the former SFRY republics and Kosovo wanted to remain a
part of the Republic of Serbia? One more question comes up, if Montenegrins that share many
things with Serbian people such as the Slavic language, religion, and history, etc. did not want
to stay in a union with Serbia, why would Kosovar Albanians remain with Serbia when they do
not share these points in common? But on the contrary they experienced repression, genocide,
expulsion, terror, and colonization under Serbian rule.
Thomas D. Grant argues for the extension of decolonization in his 1999 article
Extending Decolonization: How United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo? What are the
differences and similarities between the definition of a colony and a province? A colony is a
body of people living in a new territory retaining ties with the parent state or country. A
province is a country, region, or territory brought under the control of another government.111
Should granting the independence to peoples who live in both kinds of territories be the same?
Or should the principles of decolonization be strict to the saltwater principle? Was Kosovo
colonized by Serbia during its history, even though it was institutionally organized
colonization? For example, in western Kosovo alone during the years, 1928-9 it was invested by
colonization programs around 10 million dinars ($180,000 at that time)112, not to mention the
1990s during the war between FRY against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, settling their
refugees in Kosovo.
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Important questions arise from this, could the UN have better addressed the cases in the
decolonization process and was the decolonization and recognition process perfect? Was the
criterion for recognizing those states as strict as it appears to be now? To answer this question
Gary Wilson113 (2009) quotes author John Dugard 114(1987) who makes the observation that:
[ i]ncreasingly the need for an entity to be endowed with an effective
government and independence to qualify for statehood appear to have been less
strictly insisted upon in the recognition process, particularly where the principle
of self-determination arises. Referring to the decolonization process, he
comments that although the viability of many of the new states to emerge from
that process was arguably questionable, few questions were asked in respect of
their ability to satisfy the criteria of statehood.
Similarly, Hasani mentions the institution of the so-called premature recognition throughout
the period of the decolonization process in Africa. This maneuver was taken as a measure to
prevent the colonial states from maintaining control of their colonies.115
DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR, YUGOSLAVIA, AND
CZECHOKOSLOVAKIA
The common characteristics of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were that
they were communist countries whose national, religious, and democratic rights were suppressed
by their regimes, while at the same time poisoned with communistic ideology. Another common
element between the USSR and the Former Yugoslavia (SFRY) is that their constitutions
allowed secession but it did not regulate how, and for that reason during the process of
dissolution both former countries experienced difficulties. For instance, the first Basic Principle
in the 1974 SFRY Constitution starts with formation: “the nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding
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from the right of every nation to self-determination, including right of secession…” except that
this principle was obstructeded by lack of or no mechanism stated in the Constitution to allow for
secession.116 To illustrate, the Badinter Commission that was set up to arbitrate and provide legal
advices on behalf of “the European Peace Conference” (EPC), “the Conference on Yugoslavia”
or “the Hague Conference,” apart from principles of international law, tried to validate the
significance of the Badinter Borders Principle by relying on article 5 of the 1974 Constitution of
the SFRY. Particularly, on the second and fourth paragraphs of the same article as it applied all
the more readily to the Republics‟ and stipulated that the Republics‟ territories and boundaries
could not be altered without their consent. Conversely, the Badinter Commission disregarded the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3. By doing so, the Commission justified the separation of the
SFRY and the change of its international borders even though was in breach of paragraphs 1 and
3 of article 5.117
The Badinter Commission was blameworthy of selective quoting of article 5, which
specifies:
(1) The territory of the [SFRY] is indivisible [jedinstvena] and consists of the territories
of its socialist republics.
(2) A republic‟s territory cannot be altered without the consent of that republic, and the
territory of an autonomous province-without the consent of that autonomous
province.
(3) A border of the SFRY cannot be altered without the concurrence of all republics and
autonomous provinces.
(4) A border between republics can only be altered on the basis of their agreement, and in
the case of a border of an autonomous province-on the basis of its concurrence.
Therefore, interpretations of the Badinter Commission in Opinion No. 3 does not provide
any justification for the Badinter Borders Principle, neither the international law principles of
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respect for the territorial status quo and uti possidetis or the provisions of article 5 of the 1974
Constitution of the SFRY.118 It can be concluded that Yugoslavia was unique and that no lessons
can be learned from its tragedy, and the creation of new states within the former Yugoslav
territory was no simple matter.119 This is owing to its constitution for the reason that this
constitutional system contained a mixture of principles and overlapping rights and jurisdiction to
accommodate the Yugoslav reality.120
Article 72 of the Soviet Union Constitution of October 7, 1977, specifies, “each Union
Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR.”121 This stipulation was itself tied
to article 70, first paragraph, which emphasized that:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multinational
state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free selfdetermination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Based on the above-mentioned articles, the republics could achieve secession similarly to
Yugoslav republics as was written in the SFRY Constitution of 1974, however, there was no
procedure provided.122 Moreover, article 73 substantiates that republics are not states,
particularly the second and twelfth paragraph, which emphasizes that determination of state
boundaries of the USSR and approval of their changes is a matter of agreement between Union
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Republics, and that the issue is of “All-Union importance.”123 Even so, the Baltic States, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania did rely on article 72 when they announced their independence in 1990.124
The Soviet Union consisted of more variants of units in the government configuration,
when compared to the former Yugoslavia, which had only two variants of federal units in the
government structure (six Socialist Republics and two Autonomous Provinces). According to
article 71 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution (valid when the state dissolved in 1991) there were 15
Union Republics: Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Georgia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
Furthermore, there was a system refered to as the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics
(Article 85). The constitution mentions eight Autonomous Regions and some Autonomous Areas
(Article 87 and 88).125 In Yugoslavia there were no frequent modifications of internal borders or
in the status of its administrative federal units, unlike the Soviet Union.126 For instance, in 1920,
Kazakhstan was given autonomous socialist republic status in approximately the same area as the
country‟s present day borders. By the end of 1922, Bolsheviks had established the USSR and
Kazakhstan was integrated into the USSR as the Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
(ASSR). It changed this name in 1925 to Kazakh ASSR, and then by 1936 Kazakh ASSR‟s
status was upgraded as a constituent republic, known as a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). In
1991 Kazakhstan became independent and by March 2, 1992 was admitted into the United
Nations.
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The wording of Yugoslavia‟s constitution led to an additional roadblock during the
dissolution process. One critical problem with the constitution lies in the disconnect between
ethnic groups and their traditional territories. The constitution recognizes the “nations” of
Yugoslavia, such as the Croats, Macedonians, Serbs, and Slovenes but does not recognize any
connection these groups may have to a particular geographic area. Conversely, the six
geographically areas defined as federal units were drawn with no ethnic consideration. A second
problem lies in how “nations” and “nationalities” are defined127 with the latter defined as
“members of nations whose native countries border on Yugoslavia…” especially Albanians and
Hungarians128 as an ethnicity that lives out of their motherland.
In other words, Hungarians turn out to be the biggest “nationalities” in Vojvodina. In the
past, their population in Vojvodina‟s was very high. In 1945, there were 148,000 (76.1%)
Hungarians, 39,000 (20%) Serbs, and 7,500 (3.9%) Croats. There was eventually a drop in the
Hungarian population and then again an increase during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During
this time period other ethnic groups joined the region such as: Romanians, Slovaks, Rusyns
(Carpatho-Russians or Rusnaks, a diaspora ethnic group who speak an Eastern Slavic language or
Ukrainian dialect), Bulgarians, Germans, and Albanians. After the 1850s, these groups
disappeared from the census under “others.” An important moment in Vojvodina‟s history occurs
in the period before and after World War II, when the ethnic structure transformed. In 1941,
there were 577,067 (35.3%) Serbs and 465,920 (28.5%) Hungarians, by 1953 there were 865,538
(50.9%) Serbs which is approximately 65% more than in 1921, while there were only 435,179
(25.6%) Hungarians that is increase of only 1.2% compared to 1921. Indeed these changes are as
result of natural reproduction and mobility in migration because of the war. However, the biggest
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impact in Vojvodina‟s demography was the colonization that took place after World War II. In
short period of time, new ethnic groups appeared on Vojvodina‟s census, as well as elevated
numbers of Serbians as a result of colonists that came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Serbia. Ethnic groups that had never previously lived in these territories, such as
Montenegrins, Ruthenians, and Macedonians, among others, appeared in growing numbers while
groups such as Yugoslavs, Romas, and other smaller groups, appeared in smaller percentages.129
(See Table 4.) The number of Serbs and Montenegrins plummeted in the Republic of Serbia and
Montenegro from 1961 until 1991. According to the census in Vojvodina, there was a plunge of
the Hungarian population from 23.8% in 1961 to 16.9% in 1991, and a rise of Serbian and
Montenegrin populations.130 Therefore, it is not hard to envision the ethnic structure in
Vojvodina if there was no Serbian colonization in this Autonomous Province after WWII.
Kosovo Albanians turned out to be the biggest “nationality” in the former Yugoslavia
even bypassing some “nations” that were republic status holders. Kosovo Albanians held the
largest population and the highest percentage of regional ethnic composition compared to all
other federal units. In the 1991 census of the former SFRY, which was the final one held,
Albanians were 9% of the population right behind Serbs (36%), Croats (20%), and Muslims
(Bosniaks) (10%),and before Slovenes (8%), Macedonians (6%), Yugoslavs (3%),131
Montenegrins (2%), and others. Yugoslavs were highly committed and loyal to the Yugoslav
idea and in most of the cases, these individuals were either staunch communist supporters or a
product of mixed marriages. Their numbers were in fact lower than 2% of the total SFRY
population. At their height, the population only reached 5.4% out of 22.4 million people of
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SFRY, according to the 1981 census.132 Their numbers plunged to 3% in the 1991 census, and in
the following years, when the war started, many of them switched and joined their previous
ethnic groups.
Regardless of different opinions about Albanians being a “nationality,” “national
minority,” or “nation,” it is essential for the right of a national community to express itself as a
politically independent subject within the geographic region where the majority of the population
resides. When Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 it was originally called Kingdom of Serbs,
Slovenes, and Croats. The status of nation was given to Macedonians and Slavic Muslims.
Albanians were deprived of all rights for the mere reason that they were taken over from their
“mother state”, despite the fact that they were living in their own ethnic land, where they
comprised the majority of the population.133 Serbia had been colonizating Kosovo for a long
time, and in many periods throughout history, by bringing poor Montenegrins into Kosovo while
at the same time expelling Albanian population en masse toward Turkey during the first part of
the 19th century. The Serbian state repeated these actions again in the last expulsion of Albanians
toward Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, known as ethnic cleansing. (See Table 5.)
Statistics from the Yugoslavian Kingdom show the Albanian population dropping down from
65.8% in 1921 to 54.4% in 1939 due to expulsion and “converting” them into Turks before
relocating them to Turkey. The Serb and Montenegrins number in Kosovo, provided by the same
source as above, shows that in 1921 it was 92,490, while in 1939 their number went up to
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213,746. Correspondingly, the number of Turks drops in the total Kosovo population during the
same period from 6.3% in 1921 to 3.8% in 1939.134
The Serbian explanation that Albanians in Kosovo are part of the mother nation, in this
case Albania, and for that reason they cannot enjoy the status of nation in Yugoslavia does not
have any strong historical or actual foundation. The best example to counter this argument is the
case of Switzerland, where the status of nation is recognized for all three of its ethnic groups
(Germans, French, and Italians). Until the beginning of the 1990s, there were two German states,
and currently there are two Korean states. The population living in Taiwan represents a part of
the Chinese people, even though many consider separate state from National Republic of
China.135
Further differences existed between the USSR, the SFRY, and Czechoslovakia during
their break-up processes that led to the creation of new states. Two key differences in these cases
were, first, internal agreements, or disagreements, concerning state successor status, such as
inheritance of state owned capital and claim to the former state‟s status on international treaties.
The second difference lies in the process of international recognition and UN membership.
Unfortunately, in some cases those disagreements fueled ethnic cleansing, massive population
displacement, systematic rapes, and genocide, accompanied by wars between some republics.
One of the smoothest, consensual, and blood-free dissolutions process among these three former
states was the case of Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak Federation ceased to exist at midnight on December 31, 1992, after
both constituent republics agreed to separate into two new states. This process was executed on
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November 13, 1992, by Constitutional Act No. 541/1992, which addressed the Division of
Property, and on November 25, 1992, by Constitutional Act No 542/1992. Both were acts of The
Constitutional Law on the Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Republic that supervised
extinction by voluntary dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.136 All the assets
and liabilities of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republics were divided by agreement of
the two republics in the ratio of two to one, which was the approximate population ratio as well.
The only problem in sharing between these two republics was the immovable property located
within each republic in conformity with the territorial principle.137 At that time, the Czech
Republic held 66% of population, 62% of the territory, and 72% of the economic resources of the
former federation of Czechoslovakia.138 After dividing the state assets that included army
equipment, rail, and airliner infrastructure, there were some disagreements about gold reserves
stored in Prague. Other than that, the transition was smooth and the internal agreement between
Czech and Slovak Republics was acceptable for international creditors as well.139 The amicable
nature of this dissolution process has led it to be referred to as a “velvet divorce.” Clearly, the
Czechoslovakian case differs from the other two cases being discussed for the reason that neither
the Czech Republic nor Slovakia required recognition to be the sole successor state to
Czechoslovakia; they both applied and were admitted to the UN as a two new states and they
both informed the international community that they would comply with all international treaties
to which the predecessor state (Czechoslovakia) had been a party. For example, the UK
maintained all agreements and treaties with the Czech and Slovak Republics that had originated
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with their predecessor state. Unfortunately, this could not be repeated in the case of the FRY
because of disagreements among former SFRY republics, which will be discussed below.140
The Soviet Union experienced a different agreement among republics. The Russian
Federation accepted the USSR‟s total foreign debt along with all property, financial assets, and
other succession features. This was referred to as the “zero option agreement” after three failed
attempts to divide the former Soviet Union‟s assets and liabilities.141 While in the case of
Czechoslovakia‟s dissolution the two republics agreed that there will not be a sole successor, the
eleven republics of the former Soviet Union agreed that the Russian Federation would be the sole
successor to the USSR, except three Baltic republics. In addition, the division of assets and
liabilities of the USSR as a predecessor state was done in the ratio of 61.34% for Russia and
16.37% for Ukraine.142
In the case of the former SFRY Republics, the issue of successor status was wrought with
tension. The Republic of Serbia, jointly with the Republic of Montenegro, were trying extremely
hard to win the SFRY‟s successor status despite strong dissent from other republics. The
Republic of Serbia and Montenegro were so determined to gain this status, that they started wars
in the name of preserving the old Yugoslavia, even as it was already in the process of
dissolution. Due to the violence, the main focus at this time was not dissolution ratios but rather
the other republics desire to form independent states that was a result of SFRY‟s dissolution
process. While some other republics were declaring independence in the wake of the SFRY‟s
disintegration, the Republic of Serbia fought for the SFRY continued existence and its own role
in being the sole successor state. Subsequently, the Badinter Commission‟s first opinion
140
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declared that, “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”143
given the fact that its federal organs had lost both representativity and effectiveness.144 The
problem of the former Yugoslavia‟s succession began in 1992 when that issue was for the first
time officially discussed in the Working Group on Succession established by the UN and
European Community, and it continued to be subject, among other issues, of the Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia, held from 1992 to 1995 in Geneva and London.145 The former
Yugoslavia‟s ordeal of succession lasted until June 2001 when the Succession Agreement (SA)
was signed between five former SFRY republics, which were already sovereign states at that
time. The most important factor that led to the signing was that Slobodan Milosevic was no
longer in power. It is important to note that the SA excluded Kosovo because the Badinter
Commission choose to officially ignore Kosovo‟s case in 1991 and did not consider Kosovo as
an independent sovereign state as the Commission did with the other republics of the former
SFRY.146 Kosovo was then left trapped under Serbia. The FRY, as the self-proclaimed successor
of the former SFRY, which was technically nothing other than union of two former Yugoslav
republics, Serbia and Montenegro, was holding most of the federal property. The federal
property included all diplomatic and consular buildings together with residences and apartments
of personnel with movable property, assets of the former NBJ [Narodna Banka Jugoslavije]
(Peoples Bank of Yugoslavia), gold and hard currency reserves that had not been frozen in
foreign banks, joint property of former enterprises, federal building infrastructure that was
mostly concentrated in Belgrade as a capital town. Equally important, most of the arms and
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ammunition of the former JNA [Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija] (Yugoslav People‟s Army)
were used together with monetary gold and hard currency reserves for military support within the
Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina [Republika Srpska], and Serbian Republic of
Kraina in Croatia [Republika Srpska Krajina]. These arms were financed from taxes for more
than four decades from all republics and autonomous provinces of the former SFRY. These arms
were then used against all non-Serbian populations, first in Slovenia on June 26, 1991, then in
Croatia in August 1991, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. These enormous military
assets, over 75% of the former SFRY‟s assets, were concentrated in Serbian hands. They
systematically withdraw them from Slovenia to Croatia first, then from Croatia to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and from Macedonia to Kosovo, eventually taking control of the vast majority of
military assets.147 Later, in 1998-99, this military arsenal was used in Kosovo, once again against
the non-Serbian populations, who in the past had contributed to financing those arms and
ammunition. Problems continued to arise as the FRY considered itself not only the continuation
of the SFRY, but also as the sole owner of all-federal property and claimed all rights as a
successor state. These two republics did not even attempt to seek recognition from the
international community because they felt completely entitled to the status of SFRY‟s successor.
On April 27, 1992, the Assembly of SFRY promulgated the new Constitution of FRY and
maintained that SFRY had merely transformed into FRY and was essentially Serbia and
Montenegro.148 Conversely, the Badinter Commission recognized in Opinion No. 1 on
November 20, 1991, the other republics‟ declarations of independence; Slovenia and Croatia on
June 25, 1991, the referendum in Macedonia on September of 1991, and Bosnia and

147

Degan, Vladimir-Djuro., Disagreements over the Definition of State Property in the Process of State Succession
to the Former Yugoslavia, in Mrak M., (ed.) Succession of States, 1999, Kluwer Law International, The Hague,
Netherland, pp. 33-34.
148
Rich, 1993, p. 53.

D e v a | 46

Herzegovina‟s sovereignty resolution adopted by Parliament on October 14, 1991. The Badinter
Commission also concluded that SFRY was in the process of the dissolution.149 On May 30,
1992, the Security Council passed resolution 757 after reaffirming resolutions 713, 721, and 724
of 1991, and 727, 740, 743, 749, and 752 of 1992. The resolution noted that, “the claim by
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the
membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has
not been generally accepted.” Further, the UNSC 757 decided to apply sanctions against FRY
that included economic, international sport activities, and an arms embargo enforcement.
Previous UNSC resolutions 713 (1991) and 727 (1992) requested, all states to reduce their level
of activity at diplomatic missions and consular posts in the FRY.150 In another UNSC resolution,
resolution 777 passed in September 1992 the Security Council reaffirmed its previous resolution
713 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and stated that “the state formerly known as
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist.”151 Similarly, the European
Council Declaration of June 27 1992, and Opinion No.8 of the Badinter Commission of July 4
1992, inter alia, categorically pointed out that “the SFRY no longer exists”.152
Nevertheless, during the period of 1992 to 2000, the status of the FRY‟s UN membership
and as a state in general, was an amalgam status. Only on November 1, 2000, was the FRY
admitted into the UN153 after its official request for membership. This meant that the FRY would
now be accepted as a new state. Obviously, this happened after the regime had been changed in
Belgrade. On February 4, 2003, three years after its acceptance into the UN, the FRY officially
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changed its name from the FRY to Serbia and Montenegro.154 The FRY‟s status and UN actions
during this time period was sui generis. Judge Kreca called FRY‟s status during the period
between 1992 and 2000 a “hybrid and controversial personality.”155 Following the UN‟s
rejections of the FRY‟s claim to automatically continue SFRY‟s membership, the UN GA
recommended that the FRY apply for new membership, or it would not be able to participate in
the work of the GA. In addition, the UN SC excluded FRY from participation in the work of
ECOSOC.156 Nevertheless, the outcome of Yugoslavia‟s case in the UN at that time was a
complete anomaly. For example, the nameplate and the seat in the GA assembly hall remained as
before, the Yugoslav (SFRY) flag continued to fly in front of the UN headquarters building on
42nd street in New York, and “Yugoslavia” in its entirety remained a UN member, but not Serbia
and Montenegro. The flag that was hanging in front of the UN headquarters with the red star of
the Communist era in the middle was representing a state that did not exist anymore and was not
hanging anywhere else in the world, even the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) flew a different
flag. The UN‟s financial charts revealed an extraordinary situation. The assessed country, listed
as “Yugoslavia”, has paid $100,000 in 1992 of its $209,958 required payments. The legal
irrationality of UN membership is obvious in this case. Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Croatia are not on the list of member states for purposes of financial assessment, even though all
three were UN members at the same time as FRY (or Serbia and Montenegro) was not a UN
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member.157 The FRY was recognized by member states of the European Union (EU) in early
1996; however, numerous countries, including the United States, did not recognize the FRY until
2000, the same year that the FRY became a UN member.
There are numerous cases in which the UN handled a change in states‟ membership
status. For example, cases in which states were merged, and later divided again to previous
borders, such as the United Arab Republic (UAR). Another example is seen in Indonesia‟s
withdrawal from the GA and the UN curtailing South Africa‟s rights and participation within the
GA. However, in no case were these states concerned required to apply for new membership.158
Hence, it is wrong to compare Yugoslavia‟s case, as Ove E. Bring did, to other cases such as
India and Pakistan. Pakistan broke away from India in 1947, India remained as a old UN
member, and Pakistan, as a new seceded state, was not considered a member of the UN.
Likewise, when Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan remained as a UN member
while Bangladesh had to apply as a new state. Russia also continued its membership within the
UN and SC but under the agreement that other former USSR republics were to be admitted as
new members. In contrast, Degan concludes that the SFRY is the first clear case of a state‟s
dissolution and disappearance as a UN member. If the FRY managed to survive, and willingly
wanted to be a UN member, then it had to comply with the requirements for membership under
Article 4(1) of the Charter. In addition, those conditions for the new applicant are (1) must be a
State; (2) be peace loving; (3) accept the obligations of the Charter; (4) be able to carry out these
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obligations; (5) be willing to do so.159 The FRY at that time did not satisfy all these conditions.
Obviously, recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by some European countries, first as individual
then later as collective recognition, changed their status from domestic to international issue. For
example, the Croatian matter emerged from an internal or civil war, in which the UN should not
been involved, into an international war, given that the Yugoslav People‟s Army [JNA] action in
Croatia was an invasion in another state. Furthermore, Judge Higgins blames the UK and
Germany for premature recognition.160 Germany was in support of the “unity and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia” and against a unilateral declaration. This was the same opinion as other
Western European Countries on June 27, 1991. What made Germany change its mind within 48
hours was that its previous declaration contributed to the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, it was
the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that declared on June 29th at the EC summit held in
Luxemburg, “the unity of Yugoslavia cannot be maintained with the force of arms.” This
statement was repeated the same day by the UK as well.161 The Badinter Commission in Opinion
No. 1, regarding conditions on which an entity constitutes a state, stated that “the existence or
disappearance of the state is a question of fact” and that “the effects of recognition by other
states are purely declaratory.”162 Yet, is the recognition in international law a political matter or
is it an act regulated by law? Although, the recognition issue is ambiguous, when it comes to
non-recognition, international law becomes partially involved. For example, the cases mentioned
in the introduction, Southern Rhodesia, northern Cyprus, and Republika Srpska, in which the UN
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SC has been engaged. In Kosovo‟s case, though, there is no specific collective non-recognition
act through the UN or other international law venues.163
Recognition itself, as Lauterpacht stated, is not a matter that is regulated by law but it is
question of policy. The best example that shows the extent of how much the issue of recognition
involves politics is when Britain declared war on France because France recognized the
independence of the American colonies in 1778. An additional illustration is when in 1816 Spain
protested against recognition made to the independence of the former Spanish colonies in Latin
America by Britain and others.164 Similar actions have been taken by the Republic of Serbia in
2008. As a form of protest after Kosovo declared independence, the Republic of Serbia withdrew
all its ambassadors from countries that recognized Kosovo‟s independence.
As has been noted, it is true that things are not as they used to be. New cases in the
international arena are becoming more complicated, and there is a need for international law to
evolve. The former conservative Prime Minister of the UK Harold MacMillan once said in an
address to the South African Parliament on February 4, 1960, “The wind of change is blowing
through the continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a
political fact.”165 During the Cold War no one could have predicted that the Eastern European
communist countries, which were considered as potential threats to the peace, would dissolve
into regular normal and democratic states. On the other hand, the UN action of excommunicating
Yugoslavia in 1992 for something that in the past would be considered a national or domestic
matter, demonstrates these changes.166 A critical factor that led to the international attention was
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the genocide that was occurring in the 20th century in Europe, perpetuated by one republic,
Serbia who claimed to be the sole successor of SFRY, and actively worked to suppress other
republics and nations. Serbia or FRY pretended that they did not know that the same SFRY
signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 that stated:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples, all
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they
wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference,
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural
development.167
Correspondingly, Serbia, or the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, or the FRY continued to
misuse its own international sui generis status vis-à-vis the UN in the period from 1992 to 2000.
Particularly, when it came to responsibility in the Bosnian Genocide Case (Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia).168
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CONCISE HISTORY OF KOSOVO
“Remember that all through history the way of truth and love has always won. There have been tyrants
and murderers and for a time they seem invincible but in the end, they always fall -- think of it, ALWAYS.”
Mahatma Gandhi

Discussions of Kosovo‟s political history usually focus on the period from the beginning
of the 20th century through its independence in 2008. Although in nationalistic debates, the
Serbian side goes back further in history to the 13th century, and customarily calls Kosovo the
“cradle of the Serbian nation,” “Serbian Jerusalem,” and “Old Serbia.” This highlights their
belief that Serbia holds the historical rights to Kosovo because they inhabited the area, while
Albanians came much later from God-knows-where. This assessment would be correct if life in
Kosovo began in the 13th century, however, the Albanians were indigenous to this area long
before the Serbs arrived in the Balkans, and were related to the Illyrians through territory,
history, language, culture and many more facts.
“Illyrian” is the name for the autochthonous population that, based on archeological
evidence, has lived partly in modern Albanian territory since the Iron Age, or more specifically,
from the second millennium B.C. While Slavs began to arrive and inhabit these Illyrian
territories in the sixth and seventh century. Within Kosovo, the plains settlers withdrew into the
mountains leading to a historical territorial dispute between the Serbs and the Albanians in
Yugoslavia.169 The territory of Kosovo partially belongs to the tribal land of the Dardanians that
belonged to the Illyrian grouping.170 Evidence, that Albanians are Illyrian descendants is seen in
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the Albanian language, which has been developed from Illyrian, a fact supported by linguistics.
These language groups were spoken in Roman times across what later became the territory of the
former Yugoslavia and Albania and in the Southeast of Italy. In fact, the existence of a large
number of Latin loanwords in Albanian illustrates that Albanians, or their immediate
predecessors, were living under Roman rule. This bolsters findings that they lived in the Balkans
long before any Slav languages were spoken in that region.171 Even as Slavs began arriving in
the area at around the sixth century, the population that spoke the Albanian language continued
to thrive through the twelfth century without losing their language.172 In addition to linguistic
affiliation, the Albanian language is the sole member of one branch of Indo-European
languages173 and together with Greek is the only surviving ancient Balkan language.

Serbs migrated to the Balkans, an area that was largely unpopulated at that time in about
600 A.D. They moved south from the area neighboring the Carpathian Mountains as settlers with
their flocks and herds,174 and were first described as Slavs by Byzantine writers as “a wild
people, more pastoral than agricultural, with many chiefs but no supreme leader.” It is believed
that their migration southward was due to pressure from an aggressive Turkic tribe known as the
Avars in the northwestern parts of Balkans.175 The history, of Serb slogans that say “Kosovo is
Serbia,” tells a different story. In the region, the longest lasting conquerors were the Romans,
Byzantines, and Turks (the Ottoman Empire). The first established Slav state was not a Serbian
state; it was the Bulgarian Kingdom, which lasted from the 850s to the early eleventh century.
Next, the Byzantine Emperors ruled the territory until the end of the twelfth century. The oldest
171

Muenzel, Frank., What Does Public International Law Have to Say About Kosovar Independence?, 1999. A
presentation in: Kosovo & Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis, JURIST: The Law Professors' Network, article available on:
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/simop.htm
172
Malcolm, 1999, p. 40.
173
Bennett, 1992, p. 3.
174
Ibid, p. 230.
175
Malcolm, 1999, pp. 23-24.

D e v a | 54

Serbian kingdom was the Serbian kingdom in the Balkans was settled in Rashka (Rascia) as a
Rascian, or Serbian, state from by the Nemanjici family. The earliest Serbian monasteries were
built in Rashka, that lies in what is today‟s Sandzak region, which is north of Kosovo, but not in
Kosovo.
This proves that Kosovo has never in fact been the Serbian state‟s cradle or base as
Serbian historians and politicians claim. On the contrary, Kosovo has been under Serbian control
only when occupied by the Serbian rulers and their armies. During Kosovo‟s history, this
occurred four times (1216, 1912, 1918, and 1945). Each time though, Serbia‟s rulers were forced
to pull out from Kosovo (1459, 1914, 1941, and 1999).176 Throughout 20 centuries of Kosovo‟s
history, the longest period of Serbian rule was two and a half centuries (1216-1459). Even at that
time, though, Kosovo was not the political center of the medieval Serbian state. Its center was
Rashka, and then later in Shkupi (Skopje). This period of Serbian rule of Kosovo ended in 1459
when the medieval Serbian state ceased to exist. Kosovo then fell under Ottoman rule until the
beginning of the 20th century, a period of nearly 450 years. Several historians see one event as an
important changing point in the territory‟s demographic structure during this time. The change
caused a decrease in the Serbian population whose migration into Kosovo was mentioned earlier
in 1690. After the fall of Belgrade, a major exodus occurred as 30,000 Serbs, estimated by
Patriarch Arsenije III in his petition sent to Emperor Leopold I, traveled north toward Hungary.
This action was undertaken because of an “invitation” from Emperor Leopold I and was led by
the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije III, who 17 years after this migration, in 1706, noted a higher
estimate. In a letter he wrote to Emperor Leopold‟s successor, he stated that he came to Hungary
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with 40,000 souls. These estimates challenge the information that was written many years later
by the Serbian monastic chronicle that stated that 37,000 families went to Hungary at that time.
Clearly, there is a notable difference in numbers between souls and families. The validity of
information written by the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije himself and a chronicle that was written
many years later as exaggerated in numbers, contains other errors as well.177 It is important to
mention that this exodus was because of the withdrawal of the Habsburg forces after an attempt
by Austria to conquer the territory from the Ottoman Empire. Serbs were not the only group
faced with migration at that time, Albanians migrated during the Ottoman Empire‟s rule as well.
They emigrated to Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Turkey. During a brief period of Ottoman rule,
between 1788 and 1791, Serbia regained semi-autonomous principality and began increasing its
nationalistic behavior in Kosovo. By the 19th century, though, the Ottoman Empire had begun its
descent.

KOSOVO AND ALBANIA, A SEPARATION OF CHILD FROM MOTHER

On March 3, 1877, the Treaty of San Stefano was established between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, which granted Russia and its allies much of the former Ottoman Empire
territory. For example, the Bulgarian state‟s border increased greatly into central Albania. In this
agreement, Serbia was to take over the whole region of Nish and north Kosovo. Other Great
Powers at that time did not agree with these border tailorings and they called for a congress to
meet in Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin that was held on July 13, 1878, the borders were once
again modified, revising the Treaty of San Stefano. This time, Bulgaria was downsized and
Macedonia restored to the Ottomans. Bosnia and Herzegovina went under Austrian
administration, and the Austrian army was permitted to enter Sandzak and Novi Pazar. The main
177
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change regarding Serbia was that the Nish area remained under Serbian control but not the
territory of Kosovo.178 (See Map 4.) Albanian nationalist movements were ignited when the area
north of the modern Albanian border, the town of Tivar [Bar], part of Shkodra vilayet [Skadar or
Scutari], Plave, and Gusinje region, which was Albanian populated and part of Kosovo vilayet,
was given to Montenegro (Article 28 and 29 of Treaty of Berlin)179 (See Map 2.) Serbia became
an independent country for the first time after the Congress of Berlin, but it was subject to certain
conditions (Articles 34-42), and later became a kingdom in 1882. The statistics showing the
expansions of Slavic state territories during the period before and after the Treaty of San Stefano
and Congress of Berlin180 are as follows:

1877

Montenegro

Serbia

Bulgaria

San Stefano

Berlin Congress

4.7 km2 (1.81sqm)

15.7 km2 (6.06sqm)

9.1 km2 (3.5sqm)

37.7 km2 (14.5sqm)

52.7 km2 (20.35sqm)

48.3 km2 (18.65sqm)

n/a

172.5 km2 (66.6sqm)

63.7 km2 (24.6sqm)

(Numbers are shown in thousands)
The Treaty of Berlin dealt with the “national principle” but in reality, it was nothing other
than carving up the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which harmed small nations such as the
Albanian nation and its territories. The Great Powers at that time partitioned Albanian territories
into countries that bordered Albania. Lande, rightly concludes that, “[t]he Congress of Berlin in
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1878 offers one of the most extreme cases of the concerted action of the Great Powers, talking
and carrying out decisions affecting smaller nations without their consent.”181 However, it was in
the Great Powers interest to keep Russia out of the Balkans by weakening the Ottoman Empire.

Before and during this period the Albanian population was terrorized as Serbia, Bulgaria,
and Montenegro committed genocide against the Albanian people and took over their lands.
Albanians were driven out of the Morava region during the cold winter, where hundreds of their
villages were once located. A large number of Albanians were also driven from towns such as
Prokuplje, Leskovac, and Vranje. It is essential to note these atrocities, the expulsion, killings,
massacres, when discussing Kosovo‟s history as it was the Serbian policy at the time to create an
ethnically “clean” territory. Unfortunately, this policy continued until 1999, when the NATO
humanitarian intervention and the KLA ground troops stopped Serbia from continuing its
persistent ethnic cleansing policy, which was occurring not only in Kosovo but in other parts of
the former SFRY as well.

On June 10, 1878, the League of Prizren or The League for the Defense of the Rights of
the Albanian Nation was held. It was established as a political organization that would
coordinate defense and create an autonomous administration for the Albanians. The League of
Prizren requested the Ottoman Empire to unify all four Albanian vilayets into a single province.
The first set of vilayets were in Kosovo but had been invaded by Serbia, the second was in
Skodra but were invaded by Montenegro, Manastir [Bitolj] vilayets that were invaded by
Bulgaria, and Janina [Ioannina or Yanina] vilayets that were invaded by Greece. The League of
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Prizren informed the British Prime Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, of their actions in hopes of
garnering international support to help realize the goals of the Albanian national movement.182

At this time, there was significant activity by Russian and Serbian diplomats in the region
to promote Serbian control. Russia had a consulate in Kosovo in the town of Prizren and after
Serbia established its independence, it was able to open diplomatic offices there as well. Serbia
saw opening its consulate in Skopje, the current capital of Macedonia, as an achievement in the
region. Two years later, Serbia acquired a second consulate in Kosovo vilayet, in Prishtina. The
Serbian government was working hard on nationalistic propaganda campaigns in Kosovo and
Macedonia. The population itself was not as nationalistic as the government policy was. Through
their consuls and schoolmasters, the Serbian government continued to spread its message of
Serbian nationalism. For example, the Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic noted that Slavs in the
southern Morava valley (eastern modern Kosovo) before 1878 had “a very vague national
consciousness,” but after that, they were trained to think of themselves as Serbs only. Slavs of
these regions would call their Serbian language naski or nas jezik. That in translation means “our
language.” In fact, reports written by Milojevic for the Serbian administration in Belgrade, show
that a number of Serbs from Mitrovica identified themselves not as Serbians, but as “Kosovci,”
or Kosovars, and used the motto “Kosovo for the Kosovans.”183 The Serbian policy to
manipulate Kosovo‟s population for propaganda efforts continued until 1999. The government in
Belgrade continued to use Kosovo Serbs to accomplish certain political achievement during the
former SFRY, particularly in 1980s and 1990s.
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On November 28, 1912, Albanians issued the Vlore Proclamation by declaring
independence from the Ottoman Empire, after a series of revolts that occurred between 1909 and
1912. Serious problems developed as the territorial delimitation and the new administration of
the territory was established. (See Map 5.) The Great Powers intervened and took action over
Albania, as Sir Edward Grey noted, “as a symbol of the existence of the Concert of Europe.” A
year later, at the Treaty of London held on July 29, 1913, the Conference of Ambassadors
established the Organic Statute for the Albanian State. The statute provided several articles
stating Albania was free from Turkish suzerainty (Art 2), neutralized (Art 3), and was to have its
civil and fiscal administration under the control of an international commission for an initial
period of ten years (Art 4-5). In addition, an international police force was launched in order to
secure public order. Later that year, on December 17, the Protocol of Florence accorded de jure
recognition of the Albanian state, after its boundaries were delimited. Moreover, the German
prince was appointed as the Head of State. Albania was occupied by different forces at that time,
and was forced to partition its territories among Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. Article VII of
the Secret Treaty of London was signed on April 26, 1915 by Italy and the Triple Entente (UK,
France, and Russia).184 However, the Florence Protocol left half of all Albanians outside the new
country. The territory of Kosovo was split into two pieces, one part was assigned to Montenegro
and the other part to Serbia.185 (See Map 6.)

The Treaty of Versailles nullified the pact that was signed in London. President
Woodrow Wilson rejected the plans for an Italian mandate as an Administering Authority in
Albania and a partition of the Albanian territories between Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece.186 The
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Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, which is coincidently, exactly five years after
the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. This assassin attack, which
was considered as highly patriotic from the Serbian point of view, led to WWI. The objective of
this assassination was to break off Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a province of the AustroHungarian Empire and to unite it with Serbia in order to create a Greater Serbia (See Map 7.)
This was always a dream of the Serbian nationalist movement. Following the Serbian rejection
of the Austro-Hungarian request for a thorough investigation, Serbian provocation began on the
Austro-Hungarian border, igniting WWI. The Serbian government secured Russian support, and
under the Secret Treaty of 1892, Russia and France were obliged to mobilize their armies if the
Triple Alliance (Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy) mobilized. Why is this important and
what is the connection between this history and Yugoslavia and Kosovo?

First, it shows how old and strong the idea of Serbian nationalism was for Greater Serbia.
Second, it underlines Serbian and Russian involvement in concealing and supporting
assassination efforts. An important fact considering similar illegal actions were taken by the
Serbian state when hiding war criminals who were indicted by the ICTY in 1995, such as
Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic. Third, the group that organized the
assassination of Archduke of Austria was called “The Black Hand” [Crna Ruka] led by the Chief
of the Serbian Military Intelligence Dragutin Dimitrijevic. His alias was Apis or The Bull. He
was a junior officer who organized and participated in the assassination of King Alexander of
Serbia and his wife Queen Draga on June 11, 1903, and a failed attempt to assassinate the
Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Josef in 1911.187 The connection between Black Hand,
Dimitrijevic, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the Albanians, lies in one of
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the six members of the Bosnian Serb assassination team. The group member that assassinated the
Archduke was Vaso Cubrilovic. Even though he was sentenced to 16 years, he was released in
1918 when WWI ended. In 1937, he became a political adviser to the royal Yugoslav
government where he wrote an official memorandum called “The Expulsion of Albanians”
[Iseljavanje Arnauta]188 and later on November 3, 1944, he wrote another memorandum called
“The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia.” Another Serbian nationalists at this time, who
extolled scientific arguments for the partition of Albania and the expulsion of Albanians from
their territory was Ivo Andric, who wrote an elaborate article regarding this subject in 1939,
called “Draft on Albania.”189
In Cubrilovic‟s first memorandum “The Expulsion of Albanians,” he suggested making
the lives of Albanians in Kosovo so excruciated and terror filled so that they would leave for
Albania or Turkey. He states,

If Germans can evict hundreds of thousands of Jews, if Russia can transport
millions of people from one part of the continent to another, a few hundred
thousand evicted Albanians will not provoke a world war.
Cubrilovic, marked the triangle of three cities (Debar-Rogozna-Nish) as a territory for an
en masse eviction of the Albanian population. He recommended the state execute his plan by
fining, punishing, molesting their clergy, plowing their graveyards, giving arms to the Serbian
colonists, and provoking massive clashes with the Albanians. Moreover, he proposes the secret
burning of Albanian villages and town quarters. These actions were eerily mirrored during the
188
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Balkan Wars by the Serbian nationalist paramilitary group, Chetniks190 and secretly assisted by
the government in order to slaughter Albanians, while the regular army maintained its
distance.191 There are many eyewitnesses of these atrocities on Albanian territories throughout
history. For example, Leon Trotsky describes the Serbian slaughter of Albanians while he was
traveling to Skopje, where he witnessed burning villages and corpses along the road. He
mentions a scene under the main bridge over the Vardar river, where he observed, “heaps of
Albanian corpses with severed heads” and “what was clear was that these headless men had not
been killed in battle.”192 Similarly, Edith Durham, a war correspondent and nurse who
accompanied the Serbian and the Montenegrin soldiers, was an eyewitness to these forces
mutilating Albanian, Turkish and Bosniaks civilians, particularly by “cutting off the noses and
upper lips of their still-living victims.” She notes the confirmation of a Russian surgeon in the
Kosovo district, that between Berani (Montenegro) and Peja (Kosovo) there was hardly a nose
left on a corpse. She also heard a confirmation of a Serbian officer who states that they
“annihilated the Ljuma tribe,” a statement that was confirmed by previous reports stated, “in the
Kosovo region the ground in many places was simply strewn with the bodies of women and
children.”193 The New York Times, reports similar stories about the slaughtering in Kosovo
where the “executions are as daily sport” for Serbian forces as they push forward toward the
Adriatic Sea throughout Albanian territories.194
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Similarly, Albanians in south, in Prebeza and Janina, were killed and driven out from
their territories in the time period between the two World Wars. The Albanian population from
Chameria [Camerija] experienced the same atrocities as their brothers and sisters from the north
and northeast. The Cham Albanians in Chameria also faced massive atrocities and forced
deportation at the end of WWII at the hands of Greek general Napoleon Zervas and Plastiras. In
the 1940s after WWII, Lester Hutchinson, a Labour M.P. for Manchester, Rusholme, declared in
Belgrade after his visit to Albania that there were 2,500 Muslim Albanians killed and 25,000
driven across the border during the last two years “through organized massacres and terror at the
hands of the Greek forces.”195

KOSOVO BEFORE AND AFTER WWII

Unfortunately in Kosovo the expulsion of the Albanians, as well as the Turkish and
Bosniak population, never actually stopped. The first official contact between the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and Turkey regarding the deportation of Albanians to Turkey occurred in 1926. On
July 11, 1938, the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention was signed and was supposed to be ratified by
their parliaments. In the period after WWII, there was another “Gentlemen‟s Agreement” in Split
in 1953 between president of the former Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and Turkish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Fuat Koprulu. The agreement allowed for the forced migration of 250,000
Albanians to Turkey. They were declared Turks on the population census, an act that was meant
to save both states from negative public reactions from this forced expatriation.196
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When WWII began, Albania, including Kosovo, fell under Italian auspices. This lasted
until 1943, when Italy capitulated. Subsequently, Germany replaced the Italian occupation, and
many Kosovar Albanians in fact saw this occurrence as a sort of liberation from Serbian control.
The Serbian communists always pointed to this fact to show Albanians as Nazi collaborators.
This is not in fact true considering that statistics prove that every Albanian Jew and every Greek,
Yugoslav, Austrian, and German Jew that was fortunate to flee to Albania survived. The
explanation for this phenomenon is the Albanian cultural concept of besa – a moral pledge to
keep one‟s word and uphold one‟s honor. Even for the Jews it was amazing that Muslim
Albanians could save their lives, even though, there were also Albanian Catholic and Orthodox
families participating in saving Jewish families.197 Conversely, there is another important fact
that only less than 10% of Jews in Yugoslavia survived the Holocaust.198

During this time period, some Albanians did in fact join the Yugoslav Communist Party
and Tito‟s partisans. The leaders of the YCP made a concession on the slogan of “selfdetermination” in some official statements of the Albanian Communist Party. The Albanian
Communist Party was completely and totally controlled, and advised by two Yugoslav
communist leaders (Miladin Popovic and Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo). In a meeting that took
place in the village of Bujan, called the Bujan‟s Conference, from December 31, 1943, to
January 2, 1944 a “Resolution” and “Proclamation” were issued by all forty-nine delegates, of
whom forty-two were Albanians. The Resolution stated among other things that:

Kosovo-Metohija is an area with a majority Albanian population, which, now as
always in the past, wishes to be united with Albania… The only way that the
Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija can be united with Albania is through a common
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struggle with the other peoples of Yugoslavia against the occupiers and their
lackeys. For the only way freedom can be achieved is if all peoples, including the
Albanians, have the possibility of deciding on their own destiny, with the right to
self-determination, up to and including secession.
Not long after, the CPY suggested that any changes in the borders would help occupying
forces set people against one another.199 This was the expression of the right for selfdetermination of the Albanian people of Kosovo. The Resolution in the Conference of Bujan
was, as Professor Stavileci noted, “an act with constitutional power and international
guarantee… and the basic document of political self-determination of the Albanians of Kosova.”
The Albanian people were promised “an independent and united Albania” after WWII, but that
never happened, instead they remained as a part of Yugoslavia. The Resolution was at that time
guaranteed by the two national liberation army‟s of Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as by the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA. Even the supreme commander at that time and later
President of the SFRY, Tito wrote in March 1944,

[w]e can answer this question only like this; undoubtedly, Vojvodina and
other provinces that want to have their broad autonomy, they will have,
but the question of the autonomy and the matter which federal unit will
respect provinces conjoin depends on the people themselves, on their
representatives, when after the war the definitive arrangements will be
decided.200
Similarly, on February 8, 1946, a high ranking politician, Edvard Kardelj, who is
considered Tito‟s right hand, while in a meeting with other high ranking Yugoslav politicians
noted that, after consultations that he had had with Tito, they decided to determine Kosovo‟s
status. Before WWII, Kosovo was divided into three banovinas201: Banovina of Morava,
Banovina of Zeta, and Banovina of Vardar(under numbers 6,8, and 9 in the Map 8). One of the
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propositions was that, Kosovo could stay divided into these three parts and be spread between
three Socialist Republics, but this solution was putt down because, as Kardelj admitted that,
Kosovo is populated with Albanians and it would be normal for it to join Albania. However,
because of the situation of Serbian reactionary forces (Chetniks) of Serbia and Bosnia in
cooperation with British government can be mobilized against Yugoslavia, a union between
Kosovo and Albania would be impossible without threatening the existence of Yugoslavia.
Another participant that was present at this meeting, Miladin Popovic said that if Kosovo joined
Montenegro, they would have two problems; first was the communication between Kosovo and
Montenegro because of geographical terrain, and second was that Kosovo had more than a
double population than Montenegro and that it would not be known who is joining to whom. The
final decision was made, after Macedonia failed as a proposition too, that since the second
largest population after Albanians in Kosovo was Serbians, it was decided that Kosovo would
join Serbia. In the end, Kardelj concluded that he agrees with Popovic‟s proposition for now,
even though it was a temporary solution. Unfortunately, for the Albanians that “temporary
solution” lasted for fifty three years in a “forced marriage.” Within Kosovo, Albanians that were
involved in liberation movements, had hopes and illusions about a “Balkan Federation” that
would include Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, with Kosovo being a part of an Albanian state
or republic.202 Kosovo, together with Albania were on the table as an important issue for the
relationship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Based on reliable sources, Tito‟s
biographer (Vladimir Dedijer), wrote that the split between the two states occurred mainly
because of Albania. Dedijer presented documents that showed that on April 1948, Tito informed
the CPY Central Committee that “the first conflict [between Moscow and Belgrade] broke out on
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account of Albania.” This information was originally hidden from Tito‟s official biography by
the order of the Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister at that time (1953). During the
war, Tito wanted to establish his hegemony in the Balkans and was unwilling to share the power
by giving each member an equal voice. When leaders of the CPA (Communist Party of Albania)
wanted to discuss Albania‟s unification with Kosovo, Tito refused. Conversely, he wanted to
solve the Kosovo issue by incorporating Albania into Yugoslavia.203

After WWII ended, Kosovo was placed under military administration until the fall
of 1945. During this time, 50,000 Albanians in Kosovo were killed by the new military
rule. Even though the killings stopped, police measures against “nationalists, separatists,
and other enemies,” never stopped. In the 1950s, the interior minister at that time,
Aleksandar Rankovic enforced a weapon collection for the Albanians in Kosovo. Police
would search for weapons, and even if they did not find any, they would give the people
who had been searched twenty-four hours to hand over any weapons. In most cases,
Albanians were forced to buy weapons for the purpose of being handed over after the
twenty-four hour period in order to meet the terms of the police. This type of state led
harassment contributed to Albanians leaving their homes and immigrating, to other
countries, mainly Turkey.204

Serbian brutality continued until the beginning of the 1970s, when Kosovo won a
new constitution. This lasted until 1981, when the student demonstrations were crushed
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by special police forces that were brought into Kosovo from across Yugoslavia. In 1989,
the President of Serbia, Milosevic, abolished Kosovo‟s autonomy and from then until
1999, when NATO intervened, Kosovo‟s situation appeared to be under an Apartheid.
Today in the Balkans, there are approximately 7-8 million Albanians, except that only
half of this population lives in Albania. The remaining population is divided between
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. (See Map 9 and 10.)
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K O S O V O’ S S T A T U S W I T H I N T H E 1 9 7 4
C O N S T I T U T I O N, I T S A B O L I T I O N,
AND THE
DISSOLUTION OF SFRY
[U]nder cover of safeguarding regional stability, full independence of Kosovo may be
postponed for a while, but it would be hard for the Kosovo question to be eliminated in this regard, as
an essentially democratic and balanced solution in the Balkans. Its prolongation implies the
continuation of conflict and inter-ethnic tensions in the Balkans.
Dr. Gazmend Zajmi,

Kosovo‟s status during the period from 1974 until 1989 was as a Socialist Autonomous
Province and it was identical to the status of Vojvodina. These two provinces, along with six
republics, made up the former Yugoslavia. In order to clarify the two positions, one reflects the
factual situation of Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation, and the second is the Serbian
position on Kosovo‟s status. Serbia is right when it said that Kosovo was within the Republic of
Serbia in the 1974 Constitution. However, Kosovo was part of SFRY as well, as seen in the
SFRY 1974 Constitution. Every state‟s constitution is the supreme law; therefore, SFRY‟s
Constitution was the supreme law of SFRY and its predecessor, the FDRY. The question that
arises in this case is which constitution is more powerful and takes precedent in regulating the
law within the state? Is it the Federal (SFRY) Constitution or the Republican (RS) Constitution?
If it is Republican then that would be unfair to the other five republics that would have only one
vote in comparison with Serbia who would have three votes.205 Even though the 1974
Constitution is clear that all republics and two provinces were equally represented in the federal
organs, including the presidency.
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The Yugoslavs copied their constitution from the Russian practice of the institution of
autonomous units, based on political-territorial autonomy. Its purpose was to plan for national
minorities, pointing exactly at their status as a nation (federated republic within Yugoslavia), and
without considering the population numbers as compared to other constituent nations (federated
republics of Yugoslavia).206 However, one of the authors of the 1946 Constitution noted that,
“sovereignty” here did not have the usual meaning in constitutional or international law like in
the West. Terminology was used “not in confirmation of the scientific validity of definitions,”
but in order to articulate “the voluntary character of the union, the sovereignty and equality of
the people and the state character of their legal position within the union.”207 The only problem
here was that Kosovo‟s majority population did not join this union voluntarily, and its status and
population was not equal with the other members of this union. At that time, Kosovo was under
significant military pressure. If Kosovo‟s case is to be categorized between two comparative
international-legal models, then it is more logically to be understood as a case of the legitimacy
of self-determination due to annexation, rather than a case of a Pact Model that could be applied
to the former Yugoslav republics that entered willingly in this federation.208
The Yugoslav constitution was first drafted after WWII and it was modified several times
over the years. In total, there were four Constitutions during the time of Tito‟s Yugoslavia (19451991). The first one was the Constitution of FPRY, adapted on January 31, 1946, the second was
the Constitutional Law of the FPRY, adapted on January 13, 1953, third was the Constitution of
SFRY, adapted on April 7, 1963, and the last one was the Constitution of SFRY, adopted on
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February 21, 1974. This constitution was in use until the SFRY ceased to exist and that was
1991.
Kosovo and Vojvodina‟s status within Tito‟s Yugoslavia starts in 1945 after they were
integrated into the Republic of Serbia. This decision was supported by the third AVNOJ
Conference in August 1945. Nevertheless, the Albanian representatives were not called to
participate in this Conference. Serbia granted Vojvodina the status of an Autonomous Province
that was a formally higher status than what Kosovo got, which was the Autonomous Authority or
Region. Only the 1963 Constitution recognized Kosovo as an Autonomous Province, which was
equal with the status of Vojvodina. The autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were
de facto constitutive elements of the Federation of former Yugoslavia with prerogatives of the
republic.209 During Tito‟s Yugoslavia, Kosovo was given a discriminatory status compared to all
six republics and the province of Vojvodina until the 1974 SFRY and Kosovo Constitutions were
adapted.
IMPORTANT FACTS OF THE 1974 CONSTITUTION
The early 1970s were the most prosperous period in Kosovo‟s history. After the demands
of student demonstrators were denied in 1968 in Prishtina, the early 1970s saw important
constitutional changes. Beginning in 1971, constitutional amendments were first implemented
and three years later in 1974, the new constitution was adapted. The student‟s demands were to
upgrade Kosovo‟s status to republic and for their own Albanian-language university rather than
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being a provincial branch of Belgrade University,210 which was located 360 kilometers (225
miles) away. When the University of Prishtina was established it was the first university to use
the Albanian language in Yugoslavia. It attracted not only students from Kosovo but from other
areas where Albanian was a native language such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, which
did not have universities that used the Albanian language. Despite these positive changes, the
republic status was denied because of fears that it could provoke political bitterness within Serbia
and with Kosovo‟s Serbs.211 Instead of the status of republic, the 1974 Constitution granted
Kosovo an equal republican status in all but name. Serbia became aware of the powerful effect
student demonstrators could have though, and in 1981 when student demonstrations began again
in Kosovo, Yugoslavian/Serbian special police forces were sent to intervene. Because of the
status granted by the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was able to initially stop the Serbian police
forces at the border, they could not enter Kosovo‟s territory without permission from its
competent organs.212 Eventually, approximately 30,000 troops got in but after that, it was clear
that the Kosovo‟s counter-revolution had erupted. The main point is that with the 1974
Constitution they obtain to get Kosovo‟s authorities approval to enter the territory.
All three of the 1974 Constitutions of Kosovo, Serbia, and SFRY consider the status of
autonomous provinces a federal component, equivalent with to republics. According to the 1974
Constitution of the former SFRY, Kosovo was constitutionally and juridically positioned as
follows: Kosovo was a constituting part of the SFRY (Art. 1 and 2). Kosovo had its defined
territory and borders that cannot be altered without its consent. The frontiers of the SFRY may
not be altered without consent of the Autonomous Province (Art. 5 of Constitution of the SFRY,
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art. 292 of Constitution of SR Serbia, and art. 3 of the Constitution of the SAP Kosovo). Article
206 (SFRY Constitution) notes that the Republican constitutions and the provincial constitutions
may not be contrary to the SFRY Constitution, however, Serbia broke the SFRY Constitution
when in 1989 it abolished Kosovo‟s autonomy. Articles 245 and 246 explained the equal rights
of nations and nationalities and their languages throughout the territory of the SFRY. Additional
statehood attributes of Kosovo, according to these constitutional acts, are the right to
autonomously organize their authority such as the Parliament, the Presidency, the Executive
Council, the Constitutional Court, and the National Bank (art. 292, 300, 339, 372, and 390 of the
Constitution of SAP Kosovo). Kosovo, based on the SFRY Constitution, was represented at the
Republican, Provincial Assembly of the former SFRY (art. 284, par. 3), and at the Federal
Assembly (art. 291, par. 3). It has been represented by its member at the eight-member
Presidency of the former SFRY (art. 321), in the SFRY Executive Council (art. 348, par. 1), at
the Federal Court (art. 370, par. 2), and at the Constitutional Court of the former SFRY (art. 381,
par .1) as well.213
Equally important, Kosovo and Croatia were the only two units of the former Yugoslav
Federation that included in their constitutions articles outlining the criteria necessary to enter into
independent legal international agreements. For example, the ability to ratify international
contracts with other states and international organizations (art. 301, par. 1, point 6 of the
Constitution of the SAP Kosovo of 1974 and art. 350, point 5, and art. 396, point 5 of the
Constitution of SR Croatia). Article 301, paragraph 1, point 6 of Kosovo‟s Constitution specifies
that the Assembly shall directly and exclusively:
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[d]iscuss issues of the foreign policy and international relations; consent to the
conclusion of international treaties in cases specified by the Constitution of the
SFRY; ratify agreements concluded by the Province with agencies and
organizations of foreign states and international agencies and organizations,
within the framework of the specified foreign policy of the SFRY.214
This process was performed by the Secretariat of the former SAP Kosovo for Relations
with the World (similar to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This international and legal
subjectivity allowed Kosovo to join international agreements that were ratified by the parliament
of the former SAP Kosovo. During the period of 1975-1978 Kosovo had three agreements, two
with IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and one with the former
DDR (German Democratic Republic), which were published in Official Gazettes of SAP
Kosovo, number 12/72; 18/75; 3/77; 24/77 and 34/78.215 Another example of what the status of
Autonomous Province for Kosovo and Vojvodina entitled is seen that fact that provinces, same
as the republics, had the right to veto the federal decisions that affected their interests.216
ABOLITION OF KOSOVO’S AUTONOMY
Within less than a year of the 1974 Constitution being issued, on January 16, 1975, the
Serbian Presidency insisted on its revision. After two years, a group of legal experts published
their analysis in a “blue book.” The book itself was a top-secret document and was published
only in 1990. The document described the economic problems facing Serbia as a result of the
current relations between Serbia and the provinces, stating “Serbia‟s economy has been subject
to unfair terms of trade.”217 The document caused an internal conflict within the Serbian state
and political leadership. As a result, Tito became involved. After meeting on July 27, 1977, with
the representatives of the Regional Committee of Kosovo (M. Bakalli) and Vojvodina (D.
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Alimpic), as well as the with Serbian Central Committee representative (T. Vlaskalic), Tito
ended the dispute by deciding to not change the 1974 Constitution.218
Nevertheless, the blue book became a platform for Serbian nationalism and was seen as a
“blueprint for war.”219 Following this situation, Serbian nationalistic forces began an antiAlbanian and anti-Kosovo propaganda campaign. Using media, they pushed stereotypes about
the Albanian peoples, particularly after the demonstrations of 1981, which were brutally crushed.
Kosovo, throughout the period between 1981 and 1989, endured a police enforced curfew, a state
of emergency declared by Yugoslavia, and mass arrests by police and military units from across
the former Yugoslavia. A Communist Party “cleansing” was also undertaken throughout the
process of “differentiation.” The victims of this differentiation were mainly university professors
and schoolteachers, thousand of whom were fired, leaving a massive shortage of Albanian
professors and Albanian language textbooks.220 Not long after this process began, Milosevic rose
to power and under the banner of the “meeting of truth,” he mobilized the Serbian political and
security apparatus against Kosovo‟s and Vojvodina‟s Autonomy. He proposed a number of
measures and constitutional amendments in order to terminate the autonomy of two provinces.
During this time, the Albanians‟ secession requests intensified and ethnic miners from the Trepca
mining complex in Mitrovica, marched fifty-five kilometers (34 mi) from their mine to Prishtina
where they joined students to protest in front of the Communist Party headquarters.221
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The former President of Serbia, who was tried as a war criminal, will later call the move
to strip Kosovo of its sovereignty, “historic Serb rights” to the authority over Kosovo.222 The
Serbian assembly passed amendments to change its Constitution in a move towards
centralization. After the “state of emergency” was declared, federal forces were deployed to
Kosovo for the fourth time in its history (1945, 1968, 1981, and 1989). The process of abolishing
the provinces‟ autonomy was carried out at a constitutional level, which affected both Kosovo
and Vojvodina. The legislative overhaul was meant to solely target Kosovo, though. Kosovo‟s
autonomy was abolished by the implementation of special laws and measures on March 23, 1989
(Amendments: IX-XLIX to the 1974 Constitution of the SR Serbia adopted in 1989, published
on Official Gazettes of the SR Serbia, number. 11/89). Officially, Kosovo was de-federalized
and was re-annexed by Belgrade. These special laws implemented with help of “special
measures” were:
-The Law on the Action of republican Agencies under Special Circumstances” (Official Gazettes
of the RS Serbia number. 30/90)
-The Law on the Termination of Work of the Assembly of the SAP Kosovo and the Executive
Council of the Assembly of the SAP Kosovo (Off. Gaz. of the SR Serbia number. 33/90)
-The Law on Labor relations under Special Circumstances (Off. Gaz. of the SR Serbia number.
40/90)
-The University Law (Off. Gaz. of the SR Serbia number. 5/90)
The Elementary Education Law, The Secondary Education Law, The High School Law (Off.
Gaz. of the SR Serbia nr. 50/90) 223
The 1990 law on Special Circumstances formalized the dominance of the republic of
Serbia in Kosovo. The law allowed Serbian leaders to get involved in administering Kosovo
affairs and at the same time to nullify all previous decisions taken by Kosovo‟s leadership. The
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Republic of Serbia approved a new constitution on September 28, 1990, which included changes
that specified that Serbia was a “democratic state of the Serbian people” (Constitution of SR
Serbia, 1990, Preamble), rather than as a “state of the Serb nation and parts of other nations and
nationalities, which live and exercise their sovereign right in it” (Constitution of SR Serbia,
1974, Art.1), as the previous Constitution stated. Therefore, Albanians in Kosovo were reduced
to a “national minority” in their own territory where they were more than 90% of the
population.224 Serbia‟s amendments to the Constitution (1989-1990) changed the constitutional
and juridical status of Kosovo and Vojvodina that had been guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution.
In doing so, Serbia created a great conflict within the federal constitution in both the basic
principles and the normative values.225
KOSOVO AS A CONTINUATION OF THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION
The name Yugoslavia is rooted in the geographical position of the south Slavs. As a state
name, it appears for the first time in 1918 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia known also as the SerbCroat-Slovene Kingdom. After WWII, when Tito led a partisan takeover, it was renamed the
Federal People‟s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) [FNRJ]. This name was changed again in 1963
to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) [SFRJ] until 1991. Following the SFRY
dissolution, the two former SFRY Republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) [FRJ] in 1992. This Yugoslavia was established by
Milosevic and it lasted until his fall from power in 2000 when it changed its name to the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SUSM) [DZSCG]. This union lasted until 2006 when
Montenegro gained its independence through a referendum. Even though, both the FRY and the
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SUSM were comprised of the same two republics from 1992 until 2000, the name was not
changed to SUSM until the fall of Milosevic because he thought that saving the old name of
Yugoslavia was critical in representing the continuity with the former Yugoslavia.226
When Kosovo declared its independence in 1991, SFRY was disintegrated. Based on uti
posidetis, Kosovo held a referendum to internationalize its borders. Kosovo‟s case could not be
considered as secession because the former state was not recognized as a state at that time.227
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CONCLUSION

The best way of learning to be an independent sovereign state is to be an independent sovereign state.
st

Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s 1 President

Today, Kosovo is not Serbian, a SFRY region, an autonomous province or a republic but
it is a controlled independent state. Since Slavs moved to the Balkans, Kosovo‟s long history has
been full of bitterness leftover from different occupying forces, full of genocide and crimes
committed against its own population, and a long history of having its human and ethnic rights
denied. These atrocities widespread before and during the Serbian Kingdom, the communist
regimes, and during the Milosevic dictatorship. It was bad luck for Kosovo to have the neighbor
(Serbia) whose “tendency to dominate its neighbors is the main obstacle to progress of the
countries of the region.”228 Serbia must understand that Kosovo is independent and that “the
genie is, however, already out of the bottle of Serbia and it seems unlikely that this de facto
secession can be reversed.”229 The Republic of Serbia cannot have illusions of turning back its
history regarding Kosovo. The former President of Croatia had spoken about his idea that since
the former federation of Yugoslavia is destroyed, and that everyone in the world knows who was
most responsible for ruining this federation it was only a matter of time before Kosovo would
become independent. Consequently, the Yugoslav Federation is not reversible just as well as
Kosovo‟s independent status is not reversible.230 The Republic of Serbia made huge mistakes in
the past. This argument among others makes Kosovo‟s case unique and therefore it cannot be
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considered a precedent for other cases such as the Basques in Spain simply because Spain never
victimized the Basques en masse as Serbia did with Albanians.231 Conversely, Kosovo‟s case can
be viewed as a good precedent for cases involving humanitarian intervention. The former
Czechoslovakian president made a statement about the NATO humanitarian intervention, in
which he highlighted this point, “I see this as an important precedent for the future. It has now
been clearly stated that it is not permissible to slaughter people, to evict them from their homes,
to maltreat them and to deprive them of their property. It has been demonstrated that human
rights are indivisible and that if injustice is done to some, it is done to all.”232
Economic analysis of the region has shown that Serbia and Kosovo, who have been
separated since 1999, can reach two percent more yearly increase of their economies than if they
were in the same state. It is also in Serbia‟s ethnic homogeneous interest and in the interest of the
stability of its own state, if Kosovo remains independent. The Republic of Serbia should take a
lesson from its former sponsor, France, and former French President Charles de Gaulle, who
after years of delay realized the hopelessness and harm of the French colonial policy in
Algeria.233 Currently, all Balkan states are aiming for EU membership, where borders and
barriers do not have the same significance as seen in the other parts of the world. A German
representative (Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer) in the ICJ, who participated in Kosovo‟s case, made a
statement in which she first discussed celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the
Berlin Wall, a symbol of German reunification, its citizens exercising their right to self-

231

Tomuschat, Christian., The History Wheel Cannot be Return Back, [Rrota e histories nuk mund te kthehet
mbrapa], April 16, 2009, 05:44:00, Deutche Welle (Radio).
232
Vaclav Havel President of the Czech Republic addressing to the Senate and the House of Commons of the
Parliament of Canada Parliament Hill, Ottawa, 29 April 1999.
http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1999/2904_uk.html
233

Bebler, Anton., Lost Chance, [Propustena prilika], October 2008, Pescanik,
www.pescanik.net/content/view/2171/66/

D e v a | 81

determination, and the foundation for eastern and western European integration process, she then
declared, “my government is convinced there is room for both States, Kosovo and Serbia, in our
common house of Europe.”234
The world is changing and states have been continuously created in different ways as the
world order itself changes. The Peace of Westphalia lasted for 150 years, and continued for a
hundred years under the international system that was created by the Congress of Vienna. Later,
the Cold War began, and dominated international relations for forty years. It is important to
mention Henry Kissinger‟s view on the world order that is congruent with the continuous
creation of new states, “Never before have the components of world order, their capacity to
interact, and their goals all changed so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally.”235 This further
underlines that the case of Kosovo‟s independence has many unique angles that are understood
to be important. This view can be matched with the unusual combination of five factors;
Yugoslavia‟s disintegration, the long history of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, the
extended period of the UN administration, and the UN negotiations towards Kosovo‟s
independence. The independent Republic of Kosovo is a political fact on the ground that is
supported by historical and legal background, and the principles of effectiveness in international
law cannot be ignored. The independent state of Kosovo is important factor of stability in the
Balkan region. (See Map 11.)
Kosovo’s case will end only “when Kosovo gets what it belongs to it.
Esat Stavileci

234

ICJ, CR 2009/26, Public Sitting, The Hague, December 8 th, 2009, p. 32. http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15714.pdf?PHPSESSID=d63e3cfa77d593b8d13f6c8b36c24547
235
Kissinger, Henry., Diplomacy, 1994, Simon & Schuster, NY, p. 806.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASSR

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

AVNOY

Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia

CG

Contact Group

CPA

Communist Party of Albania [PKSH]

CPY

Communist Party of Yugoslavia [KPJ]

DoI

Declaration of Independence

GA

General Assembly

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2000) [FRJ]

EC/EU

European Community/European Union

ICJ

International Court of Justice

ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia

IMF

International Monetary Fund

KLA

Kosovo Liberation Army

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SANU

Serbian Academy of Science and Arts

SAP

Socialist Autonomous Province

SC

Security Council

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRJ]

SR

Socialist Republic

SSR

Soviet Socialist Republic

SUSM

State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2000-2006)

UDI

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Republic of Serbia)

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNSG

United Nations Secretary-General
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UN

United Nations

UNMIK

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNOSEK

United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for the Future Status
Process for Kosovo

UNTAET

United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB

World Bank
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TABLES AND MAPS
Table 1.
Not convinced236 Selected countries that do not recognize Kosovo and their reasons for not
doing so.
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Table 2.
Expatriation of the Albanians during the period 1952-1965.237

236

Year

No. of persons

Year

No. of persons

1952

37000

1959

32000

1953

17300

1960

27980

1954

17500

1961

31910

1955

51000

1962

15910

1956

54000

1963

25720

1957

57710

1964

21530

1958

41300

1965

19821

The Jubilant Kosovo, chastened Serbia, The Economist, July 31st 2010, London, UK, p. 39.
Shehu, Ferit and Sevdije, Pastrimet etnike te trojeve shqiptare 1953-1957, [Ethnic Cleansing of Albanian
Regions, 1953-1957], 1994, Prishtina, Kosovo.
237
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Table 3.
Creation of States and UN admission, 1945-2005238
Number of UN
Member States

Approximate % of total
number of States

Original Members (1945)

51

68.0%

December 1950

60

71.4%

December 1955

76

87.4%

December 1960

99

89.2%

December 1965

117

91.4%

December 1970

127

91.4%

December 1975

144

93.5%

December 1980

154

93.9%

December 1985

159

94.6%

December 1990

159

91.9%

December 1995

185

96.9%

December 2000

189

99.0%

December 2005

191

99.5%

In June 2006, Montenegro obtained independence from the former Federation with Serbia and
officially became the 192nd UN Member State. 239
238

Crawford, James., The Creation of New States in International Law, 2006, Oxford University Press, UK, p. 187.
United Nations, Press Release, ORG/1469, 2006. Also available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/org1469.doc.htm
239
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Diagram of New States (based on data from Table 3.)

200
150
100
50
0
1945 1950
1955 1960
1965 1970
1975 1980
1985 1990
1995

2000

2005

1945-1950= 9

1975-1980=10

1950-1955=16

1980-1985= 5

1955-1960=23 Decoloni-

1985-1990= 0

1960-1965=18 zation

1990-1995=26 (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia)

1965-1970=10

1995-2000= 4

1970-1975=17

2000-2005= 2

From 1945 until 2005 there were 140 new states created. Based on the table above, there was an
average of almost 12 new states created in a five-year period. If it is calculated on a yearly basis,
than it will be an average of 2 new states every year since the UN was established.
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Table 4.
Changes in the Ethnic Structure of the Population in Vojvodina from 1910 to 1991240
Ethnic Structure

1910

1921

1953

1971

1991

Serbs

Count
%
Index

510,186
33.8
100.0

526,134
34.7
103.1

865,538
50.9
164.4

1,089,132
55.8
125.8

1,151,353
57.2
105.7

Hungarians

Count
%
Index

424,555
28.1
100.0

370,040
24.4
87.2

435,179
25.6
117.6

423,866
21.7
97.4

340,946
16.9
80.4

Germans

Count
%
Index

323,779
21.4
100.0

333,272
22.0
102.9

Croats

Count
%
Index

34,089
2.3
100.0

122,684
8.1
360.0

127,027
7.5
103.5

138,561
7.1
109.1

74,226
3.7
53.6

Slovaks

Count
%
Index

56,689
3.8
100.0

58,273
3.8
102.8

71,153
4.2
122.1

72,795
3.7
102.3

63,941
3.2
87.8

Romanians

Count
%
Index

75,223
5.0
100.0

65,197
4.3
86.7

57,218
3.4
87.8

52,987
2.7
92.6

38,832
1.9
73.2

Montenegrins

Count
%
Index

30,516
1.8
100.0

36,416
1.9
119.3

44,721
2.2
122.0

Ruthenians

Count
%
Index

23,038
1.4
168.9

20,109
1.0
87.3

17,889
0.9
89.0

Macedonians

Count
%
Index

11,622
0.7
100.0

16,527
0.8
142.2

16,641
0.8
100.7

Other

Count
%
Index

72,804
4.8
100.0

25,182
1.7
34.6

78,254
4.6
310.8

94,897
4.9
121.3

263,970
13.1
278.2

Total

Count
%

1,510,822
100.0

1,514,426
100.0

1,699,545
100.0

1,952,533
100.0

2,012,517
100.0

240

13,479
0.9
100.0

13,664
0.9
101.2

7,243
0.4
2.2

Djuric, Vladimir., Curcic, Slobodan., and Kicosev, Sasa., The Ethnic Structure of the Popullation in Vojvodina,
in The Serbian Question in the Balkans, 1995, University of Belgrade-Faculty of Geography, Belgrade, Serbia.
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Index

100.0

100.2

112.2

114.9

103.1

Table 5.
Kosovo Census Data: 1921, 1931, 1939241
___ 1921 ___
Population
Albanians

%

__

1931

Population

__
%

1939_____
Population

%

288,900

65.8

331,549

60.1

350,946

54.4

Serbians and Monteneg. 92,490

21.1

148,809

26.9

213,746

33.1

Muslims

13,630

3.1

24,760

4.5

26,215

4.0

Turks

27,920

6.3

23,698

4.3

24,946

3.8

Roma

11,000

2.5

14,014

2.5

15,221

2.3

Croats

2,700

0.6

5,555

1.0

7,998

1.2

Others

2,360

0.5

3,679

0.7

5,940

0.9

Total

439,000

100

552,064

100

645,012

100

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 1938-9 (Belgrade: General State
Statistic, 1939), [Statisticki godisnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije za 1938/39 (Belgrade: Opsta
drzavna statistika, 1939), as cited in Milan Vuckovic and Goran Nikolic, Stanovnistvo Kosova u
razdoblju od 1918. Do 1991. Godine [The Population of Kosovo in the period since 1918 to
1991], (Munich: Slavica Verlog, 1996), 80.]

241

Mertus, 1999, Appendix, Table 7, p. 315
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Map 1.
Eastern Europe 1878242
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

242

Russia received back what it had lost in 1856------Green
Austria got Bosnia and Herzegovina-----------------Brown
Montenegro got Antivari------------------------------Dark Green
Serbia got the Nissa district---------------------------Yellow
Roumania got the Dobrutcha-------------------------Blue

Labberton, Robert H., and Elaxton, E., and Co., 1884, An Historical Atlas. Available at :
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/eastern_europe1878.jpg
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Map 2.
The Four Albanian Vilayets During The Ottoman Empire (Circa 1878)243

For administrative purposes, the Turks had divided Albania into 4 provinces, or "vilayets" as
they called them, of Shkodra, Kosova, Manastir, and Janina. When the European powers began
to dismantle the Ottoman Empire after Russia defeated Turkey in a war that resulted in the 1878
San Stefano Treaty, they penalized Albania (because it was considered part of the Ottoman
Empire) and divided it by ceding major portions of the Vilayet of Shkodra to Montenegro, the
Vilayet of Kosova to Serbia, the Vilayet of Manastir to Macedonia, and the Vilayet of Janina to
Greece. What remained after the division of the 4 Vilayets comprises the nation of Albania as it
is known today.

243

Hamiti, Ilir., The Four Albanian Vilayets During the Ottoman Empire (Circa 1878), Kosovo Information Centre,
London.
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Map 3.
Dissolution of USSR

USSR successor states in alphabetical order:
1. Armenia, 2. Azerbaijan, 3. Belarus, 4. Estonia, 5. Georgia, 6. Kazakhstan, 7. Kyrgyzstan,
8. Latvia, 9. Lithuania, 10. Moldova, 11. Russia, 12. Tajikistan, 13. Turkmenistan, 14.
Ukraine, 15. Uzbekistan.
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Map 4.
Borders Based on Treaty of San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin

Source: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS 1870-1914, by J. HOLLAND
ROSE LITT.D.
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14644/14644-h/14644-h.htm#page222
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Map 5.
Balkan Aspirations [showing boundaries of 1912]

Source: Map from "Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes
and Conduct of the Balkan Wars" 1914. "There was hardly any part of the territory of
Turkey in Europe which was not claimed by at least two competitors."--Report of the
International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p.38.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_aspirations_1914.jpg
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Map 6.
Lands Offered to Serbia by the Allies in 1915 in London.

The image has been scanned from a Serbian atlas called the "Historical atlas" by Milos
Blagojevic ISBN 86-17-05594-4, printed in Belgrade in 1997.
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Map 7.
Greater Serbia244

A 1941 Chetnik conception based on a Chetnik leaflet entitled "Our Way" from the archives of
the Institute of Military History in Belgrade.
Red- Greater Serbia;

Red with black lines- Territories to be attached to Serbia;

White with black diagonal lines- Croatia;

Blue with vertical black lines- Slovenia;

Blue with black squares- Territories to be attached to Slovenia.

244

Tomasevich, Jozo., War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks, 1975,
Stanford University Press, CA, p.168
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Map 8.
Subdivisions in Banovinas of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929

Territory of Kosovo was split into three banovinas of Zeta (Cetinje) i.e. Montenegro, Nish i.e.
Serbia, and Skopje.
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Map 9 and 10.
Maps of Natural Albania

In yellow descriptions are territories with population of Albanian majority still remaining outside
of Albania.

Source:
http://ajkashqiptare.beeplog.de/blog.pl?blogid=111805&from=11&categoryid=149895
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Map 11.

Countries Recognizing Kosovo, http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/

